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Abstract 
This study aimed to establish a connection, if any, between perceptions of information 
disclosure about medical treatment and decisional conflict in bereaved parents of children 
with cancer. Decisional regret was an important theme in this exploration because 
decisional conflict strongly aligns with the propensity to mentally redo past events, 
thereby forming counterfactual alternatives to reality. People generate counterfactuals to 
hypothesize a more favorable outcome subsequent to a negative event or the death of a 
child as applicable to this study. A secondary objective was to investigate the potential 
influence of counterfactual processing and regret on the construct of self-acceptance: a 
phenomenon researchers have rarely studied in the population of interest. Study 
participants included parents who lost a child to cancer in the United States after 
participating in medical treatment prescribed by a licensed oncologist. Cluster and 
convenience sampling were employed to recruit 92 participants. Quantitative methods 
were used in obtaining data samples through validated instruments for each independent 
and dependent variable. The responses collected indicate that a perceived lack of 
information disclosure about treatment risks and efficacy, yield a positive influence on 
decisional conflict after the death of a child.  Similarly, decisional conflict positively 
correlates with decisional regret, while the latter negatively correlates with self-
acceptance in the bereavement process.  The research implications call for additional 
studies that further isolate factors that contribute to decisional conflict.  This study 
advocates for decision making tools and collaborative processes that ensure parents are 
well informed and involved in making medical decisions from diagnosis through 
palliative care, if a cure is not possible. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A pediatric cancer diagnosis is a recognized catastrophic experience. The parents 
or caregivers of a newly diagnosed child confront a host of complexities in their medical 
decisions (Feudtner, 2007). When a prognosis is uncertain or poor, as is often the case, 
parents make these decisions under tumultuous conditions. Time constraints, stress, 
incomplete or obscured information, and distraught emotions, can hamper the decision-
making process, creating doubt, confusion, and, in the most unfortunate cases, long-term 
regret and life-adjustment difficulties. The healthy psychosocial adjustment of cancer 
patients and their families begins with self-agency for patients and caregivers, including a 
sense of personal satisfaction in the initial treatment decisions initiated. Self-agency 
characterizes the intentional ability to influence present and future decisions through 
personal motives and actions (Damon & Hart, 1991). 
Physicians have long wrestled with how much patients need to know and in what 
manner they should share the information. Physicians hold concerns about a patient’s 
ability to comprehend diagnostic and treatment details sufficiently, and do not want to 
overwhelm patients and caregivers who experience the stress and disorientation of 
receiving poor health news. Physicians must leverage their own discretion in these 
matters while observing ethical mandates that do not and cannot cover the wide range of 
variation in situational factors and patient needs. 
Under the Nuremberg Code, medical practitioners have a legal and ethical 
responsibility to help families make well-informed decisions about the expected benefits 
and risks of medical treatment, the risks of foregoing the treatment, and the alternative 
therapies that may be available, if any. Informed-consent guidelines are often challenging 
2 
 
for physicians to interpret because they do not offer a specific quantity of information 
that needs to be revealed. As a general principle, doctors hold to community disclosure 
standards or best practices that other physicians in the local community would follow if 
presenting a similar diagnosis (Murray, 2012). The Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1979/2013) is a more recent publication that can supplement 
the physician-disclosure guidance that was more loosely constructed in the Nuremberg 
Code. Beauchamp and Childress (1979/2013), presented four moral constructs—respect 
for autonomy, beneficence; nonmalfeasance, and respect for justice—intended to serve as 
ethical cornerstones for physician conduct. 
An ongoing debate on how to reconcile ethical decision-making practices in a 
clinical environment that is fraught with continuously shifting variables and dynamics 
influences the literature on medical decision making. Theories may tend to oversimplify 
decision making as a uniform, homogenous, and linear process. Clinicians and patients in 
an oncology unit know well this is not the case. If society accepts that ethical decision 
making is an unattainable pursuit, the story would end here. Fortunately, from a patients’-
rights perspective, this topic will not dissipate soon. The messy nature of treatment 
decision making is colorfully illustrated as follows: 
Some decisions are straightforward, whereas others challenge even the most 
experienced clinician. Some decisions are rich in ethical and religious overtones, 
some have profound economic implications for other patients and for health care 
systems, some tax the clinician’s negotiating skills, and some suggest multiple 
solutions, whereas for other decisions there is no good answer. (Whitney et al., 
2006, para. 12) 
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The present study investigated the primary decisional factors and circumstances 
that contribute to decisional conflict and decisional regret. The focus was limited to the 
presentation of risks and negative treatment side effects associated with best available 
therapies for pediatric cancers. The central purpose of the study was to determine whether 
physician disclosure of treatment risks, including treatment inefficacy potential and 
quality-of-life compromisers, impacts decisional conflict, measured by validated 
and/field-tested instruments. Physicians have an ethical and humanistic need to heighten 
awareness and sensitivity to modifiable factors that can increase decisional satisfaction 
and avoid maladaptive consequences of poor decision making. 
Background—The Phenomenon of Decisional Conflict 
Research psychologist Janis (1959), who characterized problematic decision 
making as a result of competing counter forces within an individual. The incongruence of 
these forces impedes the acceptance and final execution of a decision. The emotional 
consequences of decisional conflict include anxiety, tension, avoidance, regret, and 
stress. Heretoforward, we will subsume that decisional conflict encompasses these 
troublesome emotions. Janis (1959) further underscored the likelihood that decisional 
conflict could result in intrapersonal and intra-group conflict when decisional conflict led 
to faulty decision making with broad scale consequences. 
Medical decision making involves a narrow scope of content and affected parties, 
but the ramifications of these decisions can impact longevity and overall quality of life. 
The North American Nursing Diagnosis Association (2014) expanded Janis’ definition to 
include the loss factors at stake. The organization holistically adopted challenges, risks, 
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and regrets concerning the personal values of finances, health, career, and family 
relationships as central concerns when managing decisional conflict in clinical settings. 
Physicians may be prone to view decisional satisfaction singularly in light of 
treatment efficacy, irrespective of personal-value congruency, and quality-of-life 
indicators. One study demonstrated that when patients refuse chemotherapy, oncologists 
rated this as a good or reasonable decision when patients could articulate the benefits and 
drawbacks of the treatment from a medical standpoint alone. Oncologists who were 
interviewed seldom spoke about subjective and individual preferences related to dying, 
personal values, or other psychological constructs (Huijer & Van Leeuwen, 2000). 
A multitude of factors can produce decisional conflict: a patient’s lack of 
resources (including support systems), unrealistic expectations, social pressures, skills 
and confidence, and a lack of knowledge (O’Connor & Jacobsen, 2004). Some of these 
are predetermined in a diagnosis and others result from the physician–patient 
communication that ensues following the diagnosis. General consensus is that the 
physician–patient relationship and communication patterns are important influencers of 
decisional satisfaction in patients (Fallowfield, Jenkins, & Beveridge, 2002). However, 
vast inconsistencies exist in the manner doctors and patients navigate treatment options. 
Physicians typically present the oral presentation of treatment risks, not to be 
confused with written informed consent, in a postdiagnosis consultation. The format and 
framing of this discussion is standardized neither by the American Academy of 
Pediatrics, nor by the American Oncology Association. In the absence of formal and 
published guidance for physicians, two polarities are possible. On one end of the 
spectrum, well-intended physicians may act as the unilateral voice in employing a 
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treatment. In contrast, the patient’s self-agency and rights are central to the process, with 
the physician acting as counselor or advisor rather than the final decision maker.  
Some studies yielded evidence that two types of factors—socioeconomic and 
situational—have impacted patient involvement in decision making. Examples are the 
degree of distance between the social and socioeconomic status of doctor and patient, the 
number of cases the doctor is managing, and how much time the physician can allocate to 
each patient, (Edelmann, 2000). 
If Western medicine strives to be a world-class provider of patient-centered and 
compassionate care, scholarly dialogue is needed about how the presentation of treatment 
risks and benefits may impact decisional conflict in the short term and years after 
treatment has concluded, successfully or unsuccessfully. Although guidance does exist 
concerning the presentation of “bad news,” one may wonder why no existing model or 
standardized best practice advocates cancer patients (or their surrogates) collaborate with 
oncologists to evaluate medical treatments. From a patient-centered standpoint, the 
decision-making process would ideally result in a mutually agreeable approach to 
treatment that honors the background and values of the patient, including the realistic 
consideration of the family’s social and financial resources. Shared decision making and 
decisional aids are pillars of hope in the quest to improve decisional satisfaction. 
Research in support of these resources may serve as a catalyst to bolster further interest in 
the development and implementation of shared decision making through physician 
training and decisional support tools. 
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Shared Decision Making, Benefits, and Challenges 
Over the last 2 decades, burgeoning research described treatment decision 
making. Extant literature has evolved from broad scope and overarching questions such 
as, “Do parents of sick children want to make medical decisions?” and, “Are parents of 
children with cancer satisfied with their current level of involvement in treatment related 
decisions?” (Mack et al., 2011) into more finely tuned research problems that do not 
presuppose a desired passivity on the part of the decision maker. Available studies have 
compositely investigated several factors that influence decision-making satisfaction that 
include family support systems, the role of stress and emotions in the decision-making 
process, time constraints, trust and rapport with the child’s oncologist, clarity and 
comprehensiveness of information received, and, to a lesser degree, the demographic 
characteristics of research participants. Superficially, health care practitioners collectively 
express a willingness to adopt shared decision-making models. Several studies affirmed 
the positive emotional adjustments that occur when patients develop a strong partnership 
with their physicians in the exploration, comparison, and pursuit of treatment options 
(Diefenbach et al., 2009; Gillam & Sullivan, 2011). Although the literature contains 
positive commentary on shared decision making as a general concept, several challenges 
may thwart shared decision making from gaining widespread support and 
implementation. First, no commonly understood definition exists for what constitutes 
shared decision making, despite considerable dialogue surrounding what the definition 
could involve. Elwyn and Miron-Shatz (2010) suggested that shared decision making 
should encompass a set of explicit objectives on which doctors and families agree. 
Feudtner (2007) asserted that consensus building would likely be a key component in a 
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shared decision-making model, but physicians and their patients should also plan a course 
of action for when they do not reach consensus. Second, the parties may perceive 
deviance when a patient’s values run counter to societal values or otherwise limit the 
advancement of clinical research, or the cost efficacy associated with obtaining early 
intervention influences decision-making processes (Chin, 2013). Although not applicable 
to all cancers, a practical example may involve a patient who refuses treatment after an 
initial diagnosis but elects to participate in treatment after a relapse. It is plausible that 
this individual may require more invasive and expensive therapies than otherwise would 
have been employed.  
The third obstacle is the tendency for some physicians to employ therapeutic 
communication strategies that frame treatments in an optimistic light, in the belief that 
families need to have cause for hope as a precursory condition for treatment compliance. 
Whitney et al. (2006) advocated for a pediatric decision-making model that attempts to 
resolve the problematic intersection of ethical concerns and clinical realities. The novelty 
of the model includes differentiation between two types of sovereignties: decisional 
priority and decisional authority. Decisional priority involves the identification of a 
preferred treatment based on conventional acceptance through research outcomes. 
Decisional authority describes the final ability to accept or reject a treatment when 
competing factors no longer point to a single or best-treatment option. To offer an 
analogy, the act of steering a ship in a storm in the direction that appears to be the safest 
and closest to the shore is an example of decisional priority. Decisional authority involves 
the act of pressing or releasing the gas pedal when no shoreline is in sight or when 
multiple directions offer comparably safe waters. 
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The model posits that decisional priority should rest with clinicians when a 
probable cure is statistically high or only one treatment options exists. Alternatively, 
when multiple treatments are available with similar degrees of efficacy and toxicity or 
death is imminent—a condition known as clinical equipoise—decisional priority is 
revested with the parents. The concept of decisional priority is likely more relevant for 
clinical diagnoses that have predictable prognoses and treatment protocols. The model 
does not have general applicability for the majority of pediatric cancers that have a 
modest potential of cure or life extension. In these more frequent situations, decisional 
priority would seldom reside with the clinician. 
In a manual dedicated to the discussion of the communication and presentation of 
a life-altering diagnosis, a vignette describes a young doctor who casually speaks to an 
adolescent girl and her mother in a hospital ward about her newly discovered diabetes. 
The doctor is described as fatigued and hastily moving from one patient to another. The 
doctor smiles and advises the girl that she will still be able to accomplish all her dreams, 
irrespective of the disease symptoms and outcomes (Ahlzen, 2010). Although well 
intended, the physician may be downplaying the realities of diabetes to offer the family 
hope and an optimistic outlook. 
In a positional paper, Edwin (2008) opined that physicians overestimate the role 
of emotion in their patients, believing that stress and sadness incapacitate people from 
understanding medical information and making informed decisions. Edwin encouraged 
physicians to disclose the risks associated with treatments, even when the risks may be 
discouraging and unpleasant. A study involving 56 parents of children who died in an 
intensive-care unit supported this position. Most participants interviewed expressed the 
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desire to receive a direct and honest account of their child’s prognosis and treatment 
options. Some parents reported feeling betrayed when a prognosis was postponed or 
avoided. The study conclusion points to the importance of physician–patient 
communication processes when considering after-death adjustment needs (Meert et al., 
2008). 
The fourth and perhaps most relevant argument to this study involves the common 
belief among physicians that patients and their caregivers lack the intellectual aptitude or 
numeracy skills to fully understand the benefits and risks associated with best available-
treatment protocols (Pieterse, Bass-Thijssen, Marijnen, & Stiggelbout, 2008). Reyna 
(2004) designed several activities that illuminate the type of numeracy errors made by 
patients when evaluating treatment risk. The most common processing errors involved 
difficulty understanding absolute risk rather than relative risk. Later research supported 
the findings that most patients do indeed struggle with understanding the drawbacks of 
treatment when numerically expressed as relative risk (Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, & 
Ubel, 2011; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009;). Although difficulty with 
numeracy skills is a well-documented phenomenon in shared-decision processes between 
doctors and their patients, the existence of poor numeracy skills does not, by itself, 
abdicate physicians from their ethical imperative to inform patients about risk. Decisional 
aids can be useful tools in helping the lay decision maker align with their personal values, 
and balance the positive and negative aspects of treatments with similar purported risks 
and benefits. 
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Decisional Aids 
A decisional aid is a pictorial or graphic representation of numbers that can be 
associated with treatment efficacy and risks (Fagerlin et al., 2011). Decisional aids are 
increasingly a subject of research and discussion in the medical decision-making research 
because they can supplement a patient’s understanding of treatment options, thereby 
complimenting the shared decision-making model. In a study of adult patients with solid 
tumors, investigators found an improved ability for patients to organize and comprehend 
information related to their disease (Jones, Steeves, Ropka, & Hollen, 2013). A similar 
study demonstrated that in adult populations, the use of decisional aids improved short-
term decisional satisfaction but did not significantly influence long-term decisional 
satisfaction (Wong & Szumacher, 2012). To date, researchers have more frequently 
researched decisional aids in adult populations and with mixed results. At present, 
decisional aids are not used in pediatric oncology with any degree of regularity or 
uniformity. 
In summary, shared decision-making models rest on the assumption that most or 
all patients prefer an active voice in treatment decision making. Researchers rebutted this 
assumption in a large scale public survey summarized by Levinson, Kao, Kuby, and 
Thisted (2005). According to the survey outcome, more than 50% of the individuals 
surveyed stated a preference for their doctors to make the final decisions. Survey results 
require caution. First, what people report they prefer in a hypothetical situation (e.g., “if I 
needed medical care”) can be quite different from what they would actually prefer in a 
real-life scenario. More importantly, survey participants were asked about decisions 
pertinent to their own health rather than the health of their child. Physicians use 
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considerable discretion, but are not equipped with decisional-support tools to best assess 
a patient’s and caregiver’s needs for information. The research surrounding decisional 
aids has been slowly progressing, but generally limited to adult populations. At present, 
more than 500 decision aids are circulating, although not all of them are fully developed. 
The International Patient Decision Aid Standards (2013), a conglomeration, governs 
decisional-aid standards. 
Counterfactual Regret 
Counterfactual thinking is the pondering of decisions that could or should have 
been made if the decision maker could revert to the time of making the decision. 
Counterfactual regret occurs in the aftermath of a poor outcome when the decision maker 
laments not an selecting an alternative that hypothetically could have led to a preferable 
outcome, or in worst cases, prevented a tragic accident or disaster (Byrne, 2005). 
Counterfactual regret can be adaptive when an individual uses this thinking to observe 
patterns of faulty decision making so as not to repeat the same errors. In contrast, 
counterfactual regret can be maladaptive when the decision maker had relatively little or 
no control over the choices or if all choices presented would have realistically led to a 
poor outcome, as is typically the case when treating incurable diseases. Some researchers 
suggested that, due to the traumatic nature of losing a child, bereaved parents engage in a 
more sustained and complex form of counterfactual thinking that has not been 
sufficiently researched. This manuscript explores counterfactual regret in detail. 
Problem Statement and Study Overview 
The present study aimed to determine if parents of children with cancer 
(following death) experience greater degrees of counterfactual regret when parents self-
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report that treatment options and risks, including unfavorable side-effects, were not 
disclosed in a satisfactory manner. A second objective is to better understand if and how 
counterfactual regret, once detected, influences parental adjustment outcomes in the 
domain of self-acceptance. The first null hypothesis is that physician disclosure of 
treatment risks does not result in greater decisional regret in the population of interest. 
The second null hypothesis is that the presence of decisional regret does not result in 
lower self-acceptance during the bereavement process. 
This quantitative correlational study applied a correlational statistical test to 
determine the direction and magnitude of a relationship, should one exist. In the present 
study, the independent variable for the first null hypothesis was satisfactory risk 
disclosure from clinicians. The dependent variable was labeled decisional regret. In the 
second null hypothesis, decisional regret was the independent variable and self-
acceptance was the dependent variable. 
 
Figure 1. A diagram illustrating the potential relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable in the primary hypothesis. 
  
Physician Disclosure 
about Treatment Risks 
and Efficacy
Decisional regret
13 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Decision-making behaviors include three necessary components: actions, 
conditions, and outcomes (Eisenfurh, Weber, & Langer, 2010). A structural or process-
related approach can characterize the study of decision making in general. In a structural 
or normative model, the empirical objective is to produce an ideal decision under 
circumstances that involve risk. Common assumptions underlying these theories follow: 
(a) the decision-making agent will reliably act out of self-interest, (b) the agent is 
informed and rational, (c) agents have consistent preferences that can be altered by 
reframing decisional factors. In structural models, a decision is viewed as the function of 
input parameters that are often manipulated by the investigator. Researchers develop 
statistical and mathematical models to control for parameters and account for changes in 
results (Abelson & Levi, 1985). 
In the field of conflict studies, several foundational theories are structural in 
nature. Expected-utility theory and game theory, described in Chapter 2, are both 
structural and normative theories that explain the important influence of decision 
framing. By analyzing the volume and characteristics of decisional sets, these theories 
can offer transferable insight concerning why parents who make medical decisions on 
behalf of their children may tend to discount some types of decisions while 
overestimating the benefits of others. A weakness of structural theories is that they have 
difficult accounting for variations in decisional outcomes unrelated to set parameters. 
Moreover, some criticize these theories for failing to account for intertemporal choice: 
decisions that change across the continuum of time (Tversky, 1972.) 
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Process-related approaches to decision making borrow heavily from the field of 
psychology and are more interested in human variations in choice, irrespective of input. 
To provide a holistic literature review and a deeper discussion, this manuscript borrows 
from less linear psychological theories that similarly deduce decisional factors while 
acknowledging the complex cognitive and emotional factors that affect how people reach 
decisions. A growing body of literature under the umbrella of process theories use 
naturally occurring decisions and consequences. For example, fuzzy-trace theory views 
emotion and cognition as the nucleus of decision-making practices. 
The constructs of these theories may substantiate or challenge the benefits of 
shared decision making and decision-support interventions. Some theories also concern 
how decision makers adapt to the consequences that accompany each decision. 
Counterfactual-regret research adds a novel dimension in understanding coping processes 
in the aftermath of a negative event, including traumatic loss. 
Definition of Terms 
Aspirational benefits. Include the advancement of research and quality of life 
associated with participation in Phase I clinical trials (Glannon, 2006). 
Cognitive dissonance. Describes feelings of anxiety or regret for the loss of 
missed opportunities, once an individual commits to a specific course of action, 
particularly if the elected choice contradicts otherwise personal ideals or values (Jarcho, 
Berkman, & Lieberman, 2011). 
Collaboration. An approach to resolving conflict intended to meet the needs of 
all parties. Scholars generally prefer this approach over other tactics such as avoidance or 
confrontation (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 2009). 
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Counterfactual regret. Postdecision grievances that arise from evaluating or 
dwelling on poor outcomes associated with an irreversible decision (Byrne, 2005; 
Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). 
Counterfactual thinking. An important term in this study, counterfactual 
thinking is precursory to the examination of counterfactual regret, a key variable in the 
study design. Counterfactual thinking is the postdecision musings over actions taken or 
not taken, often with the benefit of hindsight knowledge (Byrne, 2005). 
Decisional aids. Visual depictions or animations of sequential questions designed 
to inform patients about treatment alternatives, efficacy, and risk, to better inform the 
decision-making practice (Fagerlin et al., 2011). Designers of some decisional aids aim to 
additionally help patients evaluate and integrate their own priorities, values, and 
preferences. A simple document can contain decisional aids, or they can be interactively 
supported by software programs or applications. 
Decisional authority. Referenced here in the context of a study designed to 
mitigate the contradictions between ethical aspirations and clinical realities for chronic or 
terminal pediatric diagnoses, decisional authority refers to a parent’s fundamental rights 
to accept or decline a treatment, even when clinician has taken a central role in navigating 
the decision-making process (Whitney, et al., 2006). 
Decisional biases. Faulty thinking patterns that result in a decision maker 
overfocusing on limited information or deemphasizing information that may be nebulous 
or not fully present (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
Decisional conflict. A negative set of emotions—anxiety, tension, regrets, etc.—
that result from competing counterforces in an individual concerning the acceptance and 
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execution of a decision (Janis, 1959). Decisional conflict is more probable when the 
decision maker has limited resources, information, and support. 
Decisional Conflict Scale. First developed by O’Connor (1995) to better 
understand factors of uncertainty that face consumers when making health care decisions. 
The scale further evaluates modifiable factors associated with uncertainty, as well as the 
patient’s perceived decisional effectiveness. 
Decisional priority. A term developed by Whitney et al. (2006) refers to 
distinguish decisions that should be best determined by physicians on account of 
prevailing circumstances; for example, it is the only or best available treatment. 
Decisional satisfaction. Characterized by positive feelings associated with 
making fully informed decisions with adequate support systems. 
Direct benefits. Describe an enhanced quality of life or prolonged life as a result 
of participation in clinical trials, or most often a Phase I clinical trial (Glannon, 2006). 
Emotions. Detectable neural changes in the status of feeling and mood (Starcke 
& Brand, 2012) leading to coordinated behaviors and responses (Keltner, Hiedt, & 
Shiota, 2006). As a layperson’s term, it is not necessary to redundantly list types of 
emotions, but for this study, emotions influence and are in turn influenced by decisional 
factors and outcomes. 
Framing effects. Well-documented phenomena that involve decisional errors 
made when the semantic components of information pertinent to the decision are 
manipulated to underscore potential gains or losses. In this study, discussion of framing 
effects will be limited to the context of medical decisions; thus, the term definition is 
extracted from a study on medical decision making (Peng, Li, Miao, & Xiao, 2013). 
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Gist and verbatim traces. Frequently mentioned in discussions of fuzzy-trace 
theory are essential to understanding the central premise of this theory as an alternative 
viewpoint of medical decision making than traditional economic theories. Gist traces are 
memories altered by the attachment of meaning and emotion, whereas verbatim traces are 
actual memories, untainted by emotional processing (Deretsky, 2008). 
Heuristics. Guidelines that simplify complex decisions. The disadvantages of 
heuristics is that when they are applied inappropriately or to decisions of great 
consequence, they can lead to decisional biases that are fully explained in this manuscript 
(Dietrich, 2010). 
Incidence rate. Physicians often make treatment-related decisions, partly based 
on what they know about incidence rate. Incidence rate is simply the number of new 
cases of an illness in the most recent year published divided by the number of people at 
risk for being affected by the disease. 
Mortality rate. The number of deaths or conditions caused by a specific 
condition or disease divided by the total number of people, expressed as a ratio over 100 
for ease of reference (New York State Department of Health, 1999). 
Numeracy. A component of health literacy that involves an understanding of 
numbers to determine the statistical risk and efficacy associated with treatment options 
(Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007). 
Nocebo Effect. The phenomenon of experiencing psychosomatic symptoms in 
association with negative treatment side effects, with no biological cause for the 
symptoms.  Some physicians have noted that patients may experience pain or other 
unpleasant symptoms, shortly after being cautioned about the possibility of this effect. 
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Prevalence rate. A mathematical quantification of the total number of disease 
cases divided by the total number of people. (New York State Department of Health, 
1999). 
Self-acceptance. Feelings of self-worth and a balanced awareness of personal 
strengths and weaknesses, in the aftermath of a traumatic event. 
Self-agency. Used in the traditional or general sense of the word, paraphrasing a 
widely cited definition from Damon and Hart (1991), self-agency characterizes the 
intentional ability to influence present and future decisions through personal motives and 
actions. 
Shared decision making. In health care consumption, as defined by Elwyn, 
Coulter, Walker, Watson, and Thomson (2010), paraphrased as follows: Shared decision 
making involves a bidirectional process whereby patients and their physicians mutually 
consider the best available treatment options in accordance with a patient’s preferred 
route of action. This manuscript details the benefits and challenges of decision-making 
models. 
Social functionism. The manner in which social functionism regards human 
emotions. Social functionism largely regards all emotions, negative and positive, as 
adaptive for survival (Heidt & Shiota, 2006). The focus of social functionism aligns with 
evolutionary theory. 
Social hedonism. First associated with Bentham (1748–1832), defined here to 
promote a deeper understanding of the historical factors that influenced the genesis of 
utility theory. Very briefly, social hedonism aligns with the value for pleasure as one’s 
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greatest source of good and therefore should be the cornerstone of public policy and 
moral principles (Driver, 2009). 
Trace. A technical term that that refers to how one manages and archives 
memories in the brain.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The objective of this study, in part, is to encourage a greater willingness for 
physicians to fully disclose cancer-treatment efficacy and risks, using methods and visual 
aids that will help the patient or caregiver evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of each 
treatment option while applying their own value system to quality-of-life concerns. Many 
or most patients with cancer face an array of treatment choices that do not hold curative 
possibilities. Even if the treatment goal is to extend life, parents of children with cancer 
must carefully consider the manageability of side effects. This cannot be accomplished 
without a well rounded understanding of how such side effects may compromise their son 
or daughter’s quality of life when measured against the morbidity and mortality rates of 
children with a similar diagnosis who have underwent similar therapies. The stakes are 
high for these families. 
 
Figure 2. A table comparing cause of death amongst children diagnosed with cancer. 
Note. Childhood Cancer Survivorship: Improving Care and Quality of Life.Institute of 
Medicine (US) and National Research Council (US) National Cancer Policy Board; 
Hewitt M, Weiner SL, Simone JV, editors.Washington (DC): National Academies Press 
(US); 2003. 
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Physicians have a legal and ethical obligation to offer complete information, 
unrestrained by personal doubts or value judgments about patients’ intellectual capacity, 
emotional propensities, or financial limitations. The literature review for this study 
concerns identifying those elements of decisional models and theories that may 
contribute to more satisfying parent and caregiver treatment-decision outcomes made on 
behalf of children with cancer. A realistic anticipation is that no singular theory will have 
pure or comprehensive applicability to a clinical setting and the complexity of a doctor–
patient relationship. Despite this caveat, exploring theories that have sought to explain 
expected consistencies in human decision making and the framing effects that lead to 
decision-making variation between people and even within the same individual has value.  
The totality of these theories should yield a better understanding of how adequate 
the visual and auditory presentation of treatment options can position a patient to make a 
decision that is reasonably in their best interest. The implication—in their best interest—
touches on the cognitive and affective components of a decision maker’s experience and 
encompasses the entire family system. A decision that is in the best interest of the patient 
and their family assumes the decision maker completely understands the applicability of 
risk, not only on a theoretical level, but as applicable to the specific health challenges that 
they or their loved one are facing. Researchers in the field of medical ethics succinctly 
wrote: “Understanding in the context of informed consent represents the ability to go 
beyond the recitation of facts in integrating knowledge into a treatment decision” (Flynn 
et al., 2008, para. 2). 
The depth and diversity of decisional theories, combined with what is known 
about the construct of decisional regret, should synergistically expose influential factors 
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that account for decision-making satisfaction and, conversely, decision-making conflict. 
Medicine is on the horizon of hope for improved medical decision making as a 
collaborative and transparent process, ensuring social justice for patients of all cultural 
and socioeconomic backgrounds. Decision-making software and decisional aids hold 
promise in serving a broader and more diverse spectrum of patients who struggle with 
information literacy and numeracy. 
The body of literature on decision-making theories, taken together, may have 
important insights about what type of information patients need to make balanced 
decisions whereby each can cope with the short- and long-term consequences. The 
improvement in technology combined with new paradigms and physician training will 
produce new possibilities for improved shared decision-making processes, especially in 
the area of pediatric oncology. 
Decisional Dichotomies 
In his work, Reflections on the Guillotine, Camus (1959) is known for his 
poignant but pragmatic declaration, “Life is the sum of our choices.” Chesterton (1908) 
offered these sage words: Life “is a trap for logisticians … it’s wildness lies in its 
waiting.” Remarkable scholars from multiple disciplines have dedicated their life’s work 
to understanding how people arrive at decisions. Decision-making theories are 
compelling, yet daunting to investigate because they are eclectic and transdisciplinary in 
nature. Human decision making is complex and subject to change with internal, external, 
and temporal factors. In this sense, the theories under study present a palimpsest of rich 
topography. As new empirical findings come forth, some ideas can be refuted whereas 
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others are reevaluated and reintroduced. Each modification or expansion of a theory 
yields new insights into decision making in a medical context. 
This literature review intends to explore the antecedents of decisional conflict, 
and to similarly analyze the components of decision making that can be successfully 
manipulated to produce more satisfying decisions. One can readily distinguish between 
traditional and contemporary theories. If psychological theories present a nature–nurture 
controversy, the amalgam of decisional theories comparatively debates the gut–brain 
dichotomy (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). 
Traditional theories germinate from behavioral economics and are generally 
static, meaning they attempt to explain a single decision in a given point of time. 
Traditional theories are computation and capacity based (brain-work focused), often 
drawing from mathematical models and formulas. Recent theories quite differently rely 
on intuitive factors, borrowing from the psychology of risk, including theories of 
rationality, and encompassing recent work in the area of memory and perception or, in 
layperson terms, gut-level instincts. Here is a brief survey of the historical fascination 
with understanding how a global human society makes decisions, individually, as a 
group, under conditions of certainty, and—far more captivating—under conditions of 
uncertainty. 
The Architecture of Decision Making: Heuristics and Biases 
Human beings make decisions during every waking moment of their 
consciousness. Next to breathing, making decisions is one of the most natural and 
necessary activities in which people engage. Arguably, medical decision making after a 
cancer diagnosis is different in many ways. Patients and families may need to trade 
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quantity of life for quality of life (Chapman & Sonnenberg, 2000). The decision to 
undergo treatment entails a commitment to lengthy hospital stays or frequent trips to an 
outpatient clinic, the management of multiple unpleasant side effects, and a continuous 
array of diagnostic tests that must be repeated over time to gauge treatment efficacy. 
Heuristics are guidelines designed to simplify decisions that would otherwise be 
complex if not overwhelming. Heuristics are especially useful in limiting the amount of 
thought and energy one must invest in making a simple or routine decision (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008). An example of a heuristic often employed in daily life is the price 
heuristic or pattern of thinking that automatically associates a higher dollar amount with 
better quality. Commonplace heuristics are useful, adaptive, and seldom of great 
consequence. In contrast, overreliance on or incorrect application of heuristics can reduce 
one’s ability to accurately assess risk and make decisions that are in their best interest. 
Decisional biases are defective heuristics or faulty thinking patterns that involve 
overfocusing or underfocusing on limited pieces of information in a way that distorts 
reality (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Several types of decisional biases are well defined and 
researched. Decisional biases are most impactful when used to make a life-altering 
decision. 
The reviewed literature suggested that medical-treatment decisions are vulnerable 
to decisional biases for three reasons: (a) fear consumes the thinking process, that is, fear 
of treatment complications and death; (b) one has limited memory or schema for the 
circumstances and contextual issues surrounding the decision itself, that is, parents are 
not accustomed to medical terminology and statistics; and (c) people apply a high degree 
of intuitive reasoning to the decision-making process. Physicians and patients can have 
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decisional biases and most research on biases focuses on errors made by doctors who 
overrelied on specific associations when selecting or deselecting treatment pathways. 
Because the patient and their family is the population of interest in this study, the 
discussion centers on decisional biases that occur in populations impacted by a cancer 
diagnosis. Researchers suggested that patients with a poor prognosis are particularly 
vulnerable to decision biases (Lipstein, Brinko, and Britman, 2012). High-stakes 
decisions, such as the choice to undergo surgery, radiation, or chemotherapy involve 
estimating the likelihood of potential danger. When people have particularly vivid 
memories of a related scenario, they are more likely to make biased decisions because 
they internalize and magnify risks (Kensinger, 2009). For this reason, clinicians should 
strive to help patients identify decisional biases before or while they are occurring to 
mitigate the negative effects that may occur when such biases predominate important 
health decisions. 
The following biases will be briefly discussed as a platform for theoretical 
explorations in the chapter: confirmation bias, hindsight bias, projection bias, omission 
bias, and framing effects, which are prominently considered in normative theories of 
decision-making processes. Confirmation bias can commonly occur when an individual 
has a strong prejudice toward or against a specific choice. The person will act in a 
manner designed to confirm the validity of their presupposed belief. In layperson’s terms, 
confirmation bias may be referenced as wishful. When faced with a medical-treatment 
decision, a parent of a child with cancer may have strong attitudes in favor or against 
chemotherapy based on prior experience, positive or negative, when observing friends or 
family undergo this treatment. Consequently, the parent may discount the curative or 
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palliative value of chemotherapy, which may have a therapeutic benefit for their child’s 
specific diagnosis. Similarly, a parent may prematurely select chemotherapy based on a 
positive orientation, even when chemotherapy is not the best available treatment for their 
child’s condition. 
When a patient or caretaker projects a strong disposition to a treatment before the 
facts are carefully juxtaposed, it is advisable for the physician to more closely explore the 
proposing or opposing viewpoints that preclude statistical information (Heshmat, 2015). 
Hindsight bias can be described as a feeling of having known it all along. Hindsight bias 
leads the decision maker into ascribing a higher probability to an event, after learning the 
associated outcome, than would have been estimated in the absence of such knowledge 
(Voss, Perkins, & Segal, 1991). 
The present study is interested in the psychosocial adjustment of patients who 
have selected and participated in medical treatments without curative results. Parents of 
children who have died from cancer may later evaluate their decisional outcomes as 
being ominous from the start, due to having information that was yielded after the fact. 
Hindsight bias can be an intervening variable that explains why caretakers experience 
long-term regret, independently from dissatisfaction with limited physician disclosure. 
Although the present study is quantitatively focused, hindsight bias would be well 
detected through qualitative research methods in follow-up studies. 
Projection bias, involves the tendency of people to assume that a decision made in 
the present will remain constant in the future. Decisions are highly subject to change over 
time, particularly when emotional states vary and options are reframed (Leavitt & 
Leavitt, 2011).  
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Projection bias can be avoided when physicians intentionally revisit and revaluate 
treatment options with their patients, particularly after significant changes in health 
status, emotional status, or when quality-of-life factors measurably improve or decline. 
Omission biases involve the preference for nonaction that may potentially cause 
harm, rather than action that poses less risk or an equitable risk of harm. Studies can 
creatively manipulate risk factors in both directions. These manipulations cause mixed 
interpretations of the results (Baron & Ritov, 2004). For example, participants are more 
prone to have omission bias when the harm or threat of taking action is immediate, such 
as in the case of shooting one person to save a group from being harmed (Baron, 1992). 
In medical settings, omission studies have centered on consumer decisions about 
vaccinations. Groopman and Hartzband (2012) referred to the example of the influenza 
vaccine. Nearly 40% of adults eligible for the vaccine prefer not to accept the injection. 
They generally feel well and share the sentiment that it would be unfortunate to become 
sick after receiving the vaccination. Thus, they choose inaction as a way to avoid harm, 
understanding that the decision not to vaccinate may invariably result in a flu outbreak at 
a later date. In a pediatric oncology setting, patients and their families may elect not to 
undergo aggressive therapies with high mortality rates, such as a bone-marrow transplant, 
on account of loss-aversion tendencies. 
Framing effects involve the influence of semantic factors on the decision-making 
process that results in choices that do not fully account for all available information. 
Prospect theory strongly supports framing effects, frequently replicated in Western 
studies. A few researchers found age and sex differences in framing effects. However, 
these nuances are unimportant for the exploration of a potential relationship between 
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physician disclosure and pediatric oncology treatments. When participants are presented 
with a risk that emphasizes potential gain, they repeatedly select this option over an 
identical option where the risk is characterized in terms of loss. This is true in medical as 
well as nonmedical environments. 
In a recent study conducted by Peng, Li, Miao, and Xiao (2013), the researchers 
asked participants to evaluate a drug treatment used in 100 people where 70 people 
directly benefited. The alternate frame asked the same group to evaluate a drug treatment 
used in 100 people where 30 people did not improve. The mean response was in favor of 
the first frame, where the choice was ensconced in terms of gain. This tendency is the 
attribute framing effect. A similar proclivity, known as the goal-framing effect, involves 
the decision-making person’s preference for selecting an option that invites them to 
engage in a behavior before a negative consequence occurs, rather than after the negative 
consequence has transpired. The risky framing effect findings assert that participants will 
more likely accept treatments presented in terms of survival rates rather than mortality 
rates. The presentation of risk factors is highly relevant to the problem statement outlined 
in Chapter 1 of this study. 
Classical Theories 
Expected utility theory. Physicians make decisions based on historical and 
evidentiary knowledge derived from research and experience. Commonly, medical 
practitioners refer to the concept of rate: incidence rate, prevalence rate, and mortality 
rate (Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011). Viewing the patient as a consumer, a considerable 
number of variables factor into the decision-making process. 
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Expected utility theory concerns individual preferences and values (assumed to be 
rational) when faced with a decision that includes at least two options. The evolution of 
utility theory dates back to an 18th-century moral philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, who 
believed hedonistic principles drive humans, the desire to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. 
Bentham was the first to propose the prospect of pleasure as quantifiable, and to similarly 
assert that ethical choices should be made to maximize pleasure. Bentham’s concept of 
social hedonism would later prove to be a precursory influence on the fundamental 
definition of utility or an ordered degree of preference (Bentham, 1978). 
Bernoulli (1738/1954) introduced the concept of utility as a subjective preference 
in trying to solve a famous gambling problem, the St. Petersburg paradox. In the St. 
Petersburg Paradox, a gambling game involves the random toss of a coin. Each time the 
coin lands on heads or tails for a predetermined time, players have an associated 
monetary pay-out. The mathematical dilemma involves accounting for precisely how 
much money is justifiable as an entrance fee into the game (Barbera, Hammond, & Seidl, 
2004). In a mathematical-utility model, two options are symbolically characterized by x 
and y where x and y are cardinal values on an ordinal scale. The objective of the theory is 
to determine an individual’s preference for x, relative to y, assigning mathematical 
representations to each choice, in order of preference. The subtraction symbol can 
indicate the strength of preference difference between pairs of choices (v,w,- y,z). At 
times x can be incomparable to y in that neither choice carries greater weight (Fishburn, 
1968). 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) further developed expected utility to 
include the consideration of risk factors. The frequency of a choice preference leads to 
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the assignment of a probability captured across four axioms: transivity, continuity, 
independence, and completeness (Shafrin, 2007). Initially, researchers employed 
expected-utility theory to examine preferences related to commodities with monetary 
values, such as in the case of the St. Petersburg paradox. Over time, the idea of a utility 
could be more universally applied to any decision that produces a desirable outcome. In 
health care decisions, utilities correspond to feelings of well-being and longevity. 
Utilities do not refer to the medical treatment in a direct or isolated sense. Rather, the 
utility is ascribed to an improvement in health status that directly results after the 
treatment is administered (Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011). In measurable terms, a utility of 
zero corresponds with death, whereas a utility of one corresponds with perfect health 
(Tolley, 2009). 
Utility theory draws multidisciplinary interest from the fields of psychology, 
economics, statistics, and management science because it has versatile applications, 
offering predictive and prescriptive value in understanding how people arrive at specific 
decisions. Psychologists have interest in the predictive value of the theory, whereas 
economists, managers, and statisticians hope to develop prescriptive protocols for 
specific types of decisions, supported by the tenets of utility theory. Despite the breadth 
of its value, utility theory has significant limitations. First, the derived mathematical 
utilities build on average choices over time, providing little or no account of decisional 
anomalies influenced by framing effects or preexisting biases (Moskowitz, Kuipers, & 
Kassirer, 1988). Second, the theory rests on choices made in the present moment, 
altogether discounting future choices, and the persistence of a given choice in that a 
preference that someone has today will be the same preference they have 1 month from 
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today, and into the future. Future decisions are important in an oncology setting where 
treatment efficacy, in part, depends on a patient’s and family’s long-term commitment to 
treatment adherence. 
In the past 3 decades, developments in health economics and, specifically, 
medical decision making, have revived interest in utility theory because the theory aims 
to help people explore their preferences when faced with choices that are uncertain or 
multidimensional ( Moskowitz et al., 1988). A pediatric cancer diagnosis carries 
tremendous uncertainty because cancer types and cells behave unpredictably in each 
individual body. Treatments impose negative side effects with highly variable degrees of 
curative and palliative potential. Health utilities involve defining health states or 
conditions and then assigning a preference value for each condition. Physicians can better 
tailor treatments to the needs of individuals and subgroups when they have the ability to 
assess preferences (Blinman, King, Norman, Viney, & Stockler, 2012). However, some 
researchers refute the importance of patient preferences, claiming the benefits of 
monitoring preferences compel a more critical examination of how the patient stands to 
benefit from preference-driven decisions. 
Patient preferences. Patient preferences situate on priorities and values 
concerning longevity of life rather than quality of life. Cancer treatments have not 
advanced enough to offer both, so patients and their families must be prepared to make 
compromises. Physicians who are knowledgeable about their patients’ preferences can be 
better prepared to make clinical decisions that are acceptable to the patient in the near 
future and over time. Blinman et al. (2012) discussed the variability of treatment 
preferences in general society rather than the patient diagnosed with cancer. The cancer 
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patient places greater value on the accessibility of affordable treatments. Furthermore, a 
patient who has already received cancer therapy will have a different perspective of 
treatment from a patient who is evaluating it for the first time. Treatment preferences 
must derive with a standard scale that presupposes good health to be measurable. 
Although several instruments are available with varying degrees of validity, this 
discussion includes two of the most commonly used methods of assessment: the standard 
gamble approach and the time-trade-off approach (Tolley, 2009). As stressed in this 
study, physician disclosure is paramount in helping patients achieve a sense of 
satisfaction in their decision-making process. The assessment of patient preference rests 
on physician disclosure about quality-of-life factors that, when not confronted directly, 
can be diminished or omitted altogether in the doctor–patient dialogue. 
The standard-gamble approach. In the standard-gamble approach, a patient faces 
an adverse or unpleasant health status demarcated by the letter H, such as an inoperable 
malignant brain tumor. The probability of receiving a cure through a particular treatment 
is denoted by upper case P, and the statistical possibility of immediate death from the 
treatment is expressed as P-1 (Felder & Mayrhofer, 2011). The patient faces the option of 
short-term perfect health followed by certain death or the possibility of an intermediate 
state of health for an extended period of time. In this scenario, the probability gradually 
adjusts until the patient no longer has a strong preference for one option or the other. The 
standard-gamble approach closely follows the principles of expected utility theory and 
has the longest running record as the preferred standard method of preference assessment 
in the medical community. One noted shortfall is the ceiling effect it produces for 
patients who are risk aversive. The ceiling effect can make it difficult to find measurable 
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or statistically significant nuances in gambles as probabilities gradually adjust (Blinman 
et al., 2012). 
The time-trade-off approach. When a patient is not in immediate danger, the 
time-trade-off approach can be a feasible way to negotiate difficult decisions. This 
method requires the decision maker to consider how many years of good health would be 
equivalent to years in poor health or, conversely, how many years the patient would 
sacrifice in poor health to attain better health thereafter, assuming that treatment 
selections will have a reasonable chance of efficacy (Stiggelbout, 2000). Researchers 
suggested that comorbidities influence a patient’s positive appraisal of a treatment 
prospect (other health conditions in addition to the primary diagnosis), and even 
nonhealth statuses such as income, social support, and insurance factors (Gaskin et al., 
1998). The advantage of the time-trade-off from a disclosure standpoint is that it opens a 
dialogue concerning the quality of life that one will compromise while enduring 
chemotherapy, radiation, and other invasive cancer treatments. Patients have the latitude 
to consider very personal factors that will be impacted by the sacrifices treatment will 
demand. 
A contrasting and perhaps controversial view about preferences maintains that 
people do not actually possess reliable notions about healthcare options. When facing 
treatment decisions, people process the available cues and make decisions that are subject 
to change over time, or when the cues are manipulated. Lichenstein and Slovic (2006) 
asserted that trivial preferences, such as what flavor of ice cream one likes, are relatively 
constant over time. However, when faced with unfamiliarity or uncertainty, people tend 
to invent preferences that are highly variable and subject to external influences. The idea 
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of constructed preferences underpins a growing scrutiny about the perceived benefits of 
patient autonomy and collaborative decision making. More attention will be devoted to 
these criticisms in a later section of this manuscript subtitled, Decision Support 
Interventions. 
Game theory. Game theory, credited largely to von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944), emerged as a mathematical model to determine how competing agents will make 
decisions in conflict situations. In most cases, players are assumed to be rational 
opponents, motivated to maximize their best possible outcome. The opponents are well 
informed about the choices available to reach a desired outcome. 
The scenario has a fixed number of choices and outcomes, each of which are 
invariable, meaning that the choices are discrete and constant; for example, one choice 
does not alter or build on another. In game theory, decisions, referenced as strategies can 
be ranked in ordinal number from least to most preferred. The conflict presumably rests 
in the challenge to select from options that inherently involve risk (Osborne, 1995). Some 
study designs require players to cooperate to maximize outcomes. It is important to this 
study to underscore that game theory addresses extraneous conflicts that occur between 
an individual and their outside world as they attempt to optimize material rewards or 
exoneration from an unpleasant circumstance. 
The prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 1984) introduces a fictitious scenario where 
two players have committed a known crime. They are being held in separate cells and are 
faced with the decision to either confess the crime or plead innocence Their individual 
decisions will impact their own fate and that of the other player; however, they face the 
dilemma of not knowing how the other will decide. The players can cooperate with each 
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other through the loyalty of not disclosing the crime, or defect by disclosing evidence that 
will convict themselves and the other player. The maximum reward involves only one 
player defecting, followed by both players cooperating. The greatest pay-off, betraying 
the other, also contains the highest amount of risk. Findings suggest that in a single 
episode of the game, players tend to act exclusively out of self-interest, even if the risk is 
greater, simply because they mistrust the unknown actions of the player with whom they 
are not permitted to communicate with. Game theory has been used to inform military 
tactics, political strategies, and organizational decisions in the business world (Kohler & 
Leinfellner, 1998). 
The present study has interest in surveying this multipurpose theory for its 
potential applicability to medical decision making, either as a conceptual manifestation in 
the physician’s consultation, or respectively in the form of decision support aids. 
Intuitively, game theory would appear to be at odds with the objectives of communication 
between medical practitioners and their patients. Clearly, medical decisions are incredibly 
more complex and with greater loss potential than games played in a laboratory setting. 
Also, choices in game theory are predetermined; thus, the theory does not capture the 
intrapersonal conflict that may develop as an individual navigates a complex array of 
variable decisions, as would occur in real-life encounters. Moreover, patients and their 
families are not considered to be in an adversarial relationship with their health care 
providers, and some researchers have gone to great lengths to challenge the rationality of 
patients and their families when facing difficult medical decisions with torrential 
emotions. Yet in the medical and game-theory environment, decision making is social 
and interactive. 
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Tarrant, Stokes, and Colman (2004) closely considered other game-theory designs 
such as the centipede game, which may hold promise for improving communication and 
cooperation between doctors and their patients, ultimately reducing decisional conflict in 
the process. The centipede game involves a continuous series of moves and 
countermoves that equate to a quantifiable point system. Although cooperation over time 
results in more accrued points, at various junctures defecting will result in a moderate but 
larger personal point gain. Comparatively, in a physician–patient scenario, cooperation 
equates with patients following their doctor’s advice, for example, taking their medicine 
as prescribed. 
A patient illustrates defecting by ignoring their doctor’s advice, failing to fully 
disclose symptoms, seeking second opinions, or switching doctors. Doctors can transfer 
patients or continue to see them on a rote basis without the inclusion of reciprocal trust 
and information sharing (Tarrant et al., 2004). In the centipede game cooperation is the 
central responsibility of the patient, when in life, physicians can cooperate by sharing 
risks, connecting patients to supplemental resources, or sharing other patients’ 
testimonials. Cooperative behaviors foster trust whereas defecting behaviors erode it. 
Game theory holds enduring interest in the area of conflict analysis because it 
reveals the human tendency to want to cooperate and trust when a relationship is present, 
even when it is not strategically sound to do so based on an artificially constructed 
system of punishments and rewards. Although game theory is not primarily concerned 
with trust as a variable of measurement, trust is a determinant behind human behavior in 
game and in clinical settings. Newer theories such as behavioral game theory and 
psychological game theory are making strides in determining the contextual factors that 
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predicate whether trust develops or erodes. Once identified, these future findings may 
enhance trust-building communication techniques in the pediatric-oncology setting in a 
way that may ultimately mitigate long-term decisional regret. 
Conclusion to Traditional Theories 
This section attended strongly to economic theories. This classification of theories 
subsumes that good decisions build on the quality of available information used to 
accurately assess risk factors. Although traditional economic theories offer some 
predictive value for simple decisions that occur in a laboratory setting, these theories lack 
universality when applied to medical-decision settings with variables that are obscure, 
dynamic, and fleeting. Here, this manuscript departs from economic theories that evoke 
experimental designs that define decision-making risks in absolute terms. 
To present a rounded analysis of the published literature, next is a comparative 
explication of modern theories that deemphasize decision making as a calculus or 
intersection of risk factors and desired outcomes. In contrast, modern theories envelop the 
role of emotions, perceptions, and memory in decisional outcomes; factors intentionally 
omitted in economic and behavioral theories. Researchers demonstrated that anxiety and 
depression positively correlate with decisional conflict (Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010). 
Other studies and theories magnify the inherent errors that occur in memory and 
perception and ultimately influence decisional processes (Kensinger, 2009). 
Contemporary Theories and Concepts 
The role of emotions. Emotions are feelings that arise from a class of stimuli, 
such as threats or joyful images, and ultimately result in detectable neural changes 
(Starcke & Brand, 2012), physiological responses, and coordinated behavior (Keltner, 
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Hiedt, & Shiota, 2006). Emotions, positive or negative, are central to decision making 
because they have a large influence on motivations (Consedine, Magai, Krivoshekova, 
Ryzewics, & Neugut, 2004). Until recent decades, very few investigators attempted to 
study the relationship between emotions and decision making. The challenge is trying to 
study emotions when it becomes necessary to isolate not only a particular emotion, but 
the object or situation that has evoked it. 
Several emotions can impact decisional processes. It is possible, for example, that 
in a study attempting to isolate the correlation between depression and decisional 
conflict, discrete emotions like fear and embarrassment are inevitably present, even when 
not controlled for in the study. Such emotions may move together in a positive or 
negative direction in a plotted display referenced as a covariance (Kenny, 1979). 
Covariances are difficult to monitor and account for when many emotions intertwine. 
Contemporary decisional theories, in contrast to behavioral and economic 
theories, aim to account for the role of emotion in the processing and evaluation of risk, 
including post-decision-making outcomes such as human adaptation and adjustment to 
decisional consequences. The parallel interplay of cognition and emotion is widely 
accepted as a real and adaptive phenomenon in recent literature. These findings lend 
insight to the research questions in this study because one variable under investigation is 
decisional regret. 
In early literature, scientists who study decision making viewed emotions as 
superfluous and disruptive to the target action of making a rational decision (Reynolds, 
Lynn, Zhou, & Consedine, 2015). Medical providers have been socialized not to become 
emotionally involved with their patients. Western physicians have long favored 
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emotional distance and detachment as a way of adhering to the norm of clinical 
objectivity, a construct that cautions physicians not to allow emotions to interfere with 
clinical judgment, diagnostics, and the application of medical treatment (Yakeley, Hale, 
Johnston, Kirtchuk, & Shoenberg, 2014). The practice of clinical objectivity can lend 
understanding to why doctors view patients’ expressed emotions as a hindrance to 
selecting and adhering to a course of treatment. This is especially true for cancer patients 
and their families who are experiencing fear and anxiety in association with multiple 
issues (anticipation of pain, prognosis, treatment options, loss of normal routines, and 
death). 
Social functionism, with roots in evolutionary theory, regards emotions as 
adaptive and necessary for survival. In this theoretical orientation, even emotions such as 
fear and anger are beneficial in helping an individual identify and assess threats in their 
environment (Keltner et al., 2006). In general, negative emotions can be health promoting 
when the emotions are situation specific or dispositional to a specific diagnosis or 
medical condition (Consedine & Moskowitz, 2007). 
In a frequently cited study, researchers qualitative assessed women with breast 
cancer concerning their fear in relation to three separate independent variables: the 
screening process and mechanisms themselves, screening outcomes, and general fear of 
cancer. Researchers concluded that the women who were more situationally fearful about 
breast cancer, rather than all three items, were more likely to make the decision to 
participate in early detection screenings (Consedine, Magai, Krivoshekova, Ryzewics, & 
Neugut, 2004). Similarly, the display of prideful emotions is often culturally and socially 
discouraged as unattractive, especially for women; yet fostering pride can serve the 
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purpose of helping women better comprehend and recall information about medical risks 
(Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). 
Medical decision making is more complicated than ever before. As the global 
sophistication of medical science develops and grows, patients and their surrogates have 
a widening spectrum of choices to consider. Genetic screening and counseling offer the 
opportunity for willing participants to examine probabilities associated with their 
vulnerabilities and predispositions to certain hereditary diseases. Consequently, genetic 
screening is a useful testing ground for understanding how emotions impact risk 
assessment and decisional satisfaction. Researchers classified women who underwent 
genetic screenings for breast cancer according to their decisional status: early, 
intermediate, late, or non-decision maker. The researchers also considered self-reported 
depression, generalized anxiety, and situation-specific anxiety. Comparatively, women 
with depression 1 month after making the decision to undergo screening were also more 
likely to score high on decisional conflict (Rini et al., 2009). More studies are needed to 
understand the emotional factors that distort risk assessment; longitudinal studies need to 
determine if and how positive and negative emotions can mitigate or prevent decisional 
conflict. 
Fuzzy-trace theory. Intuition is at the epicenter of reasoning in fuzzy-trace 
theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990), a reasoning model and false memory paradigm that 
gained popularity by offering an explanation for false eyewitness testimony in legal 
arenas. More recently, researchers have applied fuzzy-trace theory to the assessment of 
risk in medical decision-making scenarios (Reyna, 2004). Fuzzy-trace theory can be 
viewed as a contemporary alternative to behavioral economics or capacity-driven theories 
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in the analysis of decisional processes and outcomes. Fuzzy-trace theory focuses on the 
influence of working memory, assessing how adults qualitatively reason through the risks 
associated with available choices, such as the willful acceptance or avoidance of those 
risks. Trace, as a scientific construct, directly refers to the manner people manage 
memories, archived by the brain. Verbatim traces are memories recorded as they occurred 
in actuality, without any altering of actual reality. 
Gist traces, in contrast, are memories altered by the primal attachment of meaning 
and emotion (Deretsky, 2008). Brainerd and Reyna (1990) posited that people process 
verbatim and gist-memory traces in a dual and parallel manner or milliseconds apart, 
although the frequency with which this results in memory impairments varies from one 
developmental stage to another. Human attach meaning to most memories. According to 
Reyna (2004), psychophysical errors that occur after people project meaning onto 
verbatim traces hamper rational decision making. Consequently, people evaluate risk in 
the context of gist traces, and either ignore or misunderstand pertinent information. 
If this argument has merit, than it logically follows that patients and caregivers 
who evaluate medical treatment will employ faulty reasoning, no matter how much risk 
their physician accurately depicts when presenting a prognosis. In one study, Reyna and 
Hamilton (2001) discovered that patient participants could not reliably recall the specific 
probabilities, expressed numerically, about the risks of not having surgery versus the risk 
of the surgery itself; a task that is associated with verbatim trace memory. Surprisingly, 
the same patients could accurately rank levels of risk from high to low in the correct 
order. The same study presented the additional finding that study participants displayed 
the tendency to ignore the number of possibilities (base-rate neglect), and to ignore 
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overlapping classes of risk, indicated with the use of blue and red tokens that represented 
more than one risk category. Although most scientists agree that the human memory is 
fragile and unreliable, fuzzy-trace theory might be critiqued for approaching the influence 
of emotions as a singular proposition, without differentiating the effects of positive 
versus negative emotional experiences on the accurate recall and comprehension of risk 
factors. 
Kensinger (2009) argued that positive and negative events result in more vibrant 
memories than neutral events; an outcome attributed to increased brain activity between 
the hippocampus and amygdala. A second component of Kensinger’s hypothesis, 
supported by neuroimaging studies, demonstrated that emotionally charged events result 
in superior recall of intrinsic contextual features but a compromised recall of extrinsic 
contextual features. A practical illustration involves showing pictures of a threatening 
snake to a group of participants. 
Although participants may later recall, in great detail, portions of the image that 
were frightening—fangs, shape of teeth, etc.—the same participants will likely have a 
dissipated memory of the items surrounding the snake such as trees, sky, and rocks. The 
same researchers suggested that the researcher has considerable influence over the 
strength of recall; researchers instruct participants to pay special attention to the details of 
an object or event, a type of guidance referred to as encoding instructions (Kensinger, 
2009). 
Fuzzy-trace theory does not consider the counteractive measures an oncologist 
might take in their patient communication and presentation of treatment choices, which 
might help patients recall risk factors well after the consultation has concluded. 
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Contemporary work on memory and emotions (Kensinger, 2009; Reyna & Hamilton, 
2001) presents an important departure from economic and behavioral theories of decision 
making, allowing researchers to leap forward with an important premise: the notion that 
emotions as precursory influencers over the types of stimuli people remember and with 
what degree of accuracy. Hence, the improvement of decisional satisfaction does not rest 
alone on improving patient numeracy and making risk factors more visible and 
intelligible to the layperson. Rather, the oncologist must now view emotion as a natural 
rather than an irrational component of decision making. 
Sadness, fear, and grief have their place in the decisional process, but because 
they can shadow the accurate recollection of risk, it will be important for people to revisit 
risk factors multiple times in the health care journey, albeit inconvenient and inefficient, 
but central to patient satisfaction through the reduction of decisional regret. The view of 
emotion in the framework of fuzzy-trace theory has meaningful relevance for patients 
considering Phase 1 clinical trials. Medical professionals reserve Phase 1 trials for 
populations of cancer patients who have disease progress that is unresponsive to 
traditional or conventional therapies. Patients who are eligible for these trials often 
experience more intense emotion than patients who are progressing well on traditional 
therapies, or who are in a temporary remission state or hiatus from treatment. 
Although emotion and cognitive patterns are mutually interdependent and part of 
rational decision making, excessive emotion such as overoptimism may lead someone to 
participate in a clinical trial under unrealistic and false understanding. Similarly, intense 
fear and grief may cause a patient or caregiver to decline participation before they have 
received and fully evaluated the statistical facts. Patient information needs for these types 
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of trials are also unique because patients often confuse research with therapy. Another 
important distinction that can blur is the difference between direct benefits and 
aspirational benefits. Direct benefits have salutary effects in that they prolong the life of a 
patient or otherwise improve the quality of life they have remaining. Aspirational benefits 
are offered when the patient’s participation in the trial will bring valuable data to benefit 
future patients with the same or similar type of disease (Glannon, 2006). 
Finally, fuzzy-trace theory has implications for the design of decisional aids. 
Decisional aids factor in emotions and offer different decisional pathways for patients 
experiencing turbulent emotions rather than those whose fear and anxiety have leveled 
over the course of time. The influence of emotions on memory and decision-making 
processes compels medicolegal industries to consider offering patients, oncologists, and 
caregivers more flexibility in the timing that information is delivered, absorbed, and acted 
upon. For example, the practice of informed consent disallows patients from participating 
in clinical trials without full disclosure of risks. To ensure the employment of timely 
treatment, oncologists must divulge information readily. Patients or caregivers are 
expected to make prompt decisions accordingly. 
 
In a study of communication practices and attitudes between oncologists and 
cancer patients, 61% of oncologists reported the wish and preference to deliver 
information in smaller increments because they were convinced patients were too grieved 
or too much in shock to comprehend the shared information (Taylor & Kelner, 1987). 
Fast decisions are not necessarily good decisions that incorporate patients’ needs and 
value systems. A commitment to decisions as life altering as surgery or an intensive 
chemotherapy or radiation course should not be made in a time-pressured environment, 
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particularly when treatment outcomes are of great consequence and efficacy rates are low 
or uncertain. 
Postdecisional Regret 
Regret is a universal human experience with cognitive and affective components.  
(Altman, 2017).  Sorrow and grief are emotions closely tied to regret, whereas 
remembrance, inward thinking, self-blame, and doubt characterize thinking and reasoning 
patterns that are characteristic of regret (Landman, 1993. Regret is an inherent part of 
living and developing, yet most seek to avoid the experience of regret whenever possible. 
An intriguing distinction and one not easily determined is whether regret occurs based on 
the decision itself, or as a result of the decision-making process itself; that is, lack of 
information, lack of support, lack of time, and limited options (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 
2002). 
Regret is a central theme of interest in this study, but also very broad in definition 
and application. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately distinguish one type of regret 
from another to sufficiently isolate a specific type of regret as the independent variable. 
Regret is a transitive verb, meaning that the action of regret attaches to a person, event, or 
situation. 
Although many studies focus exclusively on predecisional regret, this study 
targeted postdecisional regret or thoughts and feelings experienced after a treatment 
decision is made and followed in full, or until illness or death prohibited completion of 
the treatment. Types of regret are defined and exemplified in the context of cancer 
treatment rather than the general experience of regret. Outcome regret describes regret 
associated with illness or death that a patient or their surrogate believes is a direct result 
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or byproduct of a specific decision. Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) introduced the idea of 
procedural regret. When experimentally manipulated, procedural regret can be coaxed 
when patients or caregivers are not permitted enough time to evaluate the benefits and 
drawbacks of a decision, or perhaps distractions are deliberately interjected to disallow 
focused concentration on the decision-making process itself. 
In a clinical setting, procedural regret can be at play when treatment decisions 
need to be rapidly made following a diagnosis, or patients feel unsafe or uncomfortable 
asking a sufficient number of questions before committing to a course of treatment. Early 
regret studies often concerned determining regret as a consequence of action rather than 
inaction, stressing that people more intensely regretted poor outcomes aligned with 
inaction than those that transpired from action (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Inaction is 
rarely an option for consideration after the initial diagnosis of cancer, particularly in 
pediatric populations where legal systems compel parents to accept and comply with best 
available therapies. Contemporary research draws from psychology to accentuate 
emotional and cognitive factors as integral to understanding the variability and duration 
of regret. 
Counterfactual Regret 
Counterfactual thinking is a naturally occurring phenomenon that involves 
imaginative alternatives to reality or the mental reconstruction of a past event (Byrne, 
2005). People generate counterfactual thinking when precipitating events or antecedents 
mentally mutate to produce a different outcome to the one experienced. In a linguistic 
sense, counterfactual thinking occurs when a person uses mental scripts that contain “If 
… then” clauses (Roese & Olson, 2014). A simple example might be, “If I had not 
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injured my knee, I would have won the tennis match,” or “If I had not trained so hard, I 
may have lost the marathon.” Hence, one’s reality alters with the use of mutations that 
are additions, subtractions, or substitutions to any or all events leading to a specific 
outcome. The ease with which one can alter these events is referenced as mutability 
(Wells & Gavansky, 1989). 
Counterfactual thinking can be upward, that is, directed to how an outcome may 
have been better, or it can be downward, that is, applied to how something would have 
made things worse (Mandel & Lehman, 1998) . Kahnemann and Miller (1986) predicted 
that upward counterfactuals exacerbate negative emotions and increase the potential for 
inward associations of controllability. Upward counterfactual thinking is parallel to 
counterfactual regret on the basis of perceived preventability and self-implication. In 
contrast, downward counterfactuals intensify positive emotions. One can direct 
counterfactual thinking to the actions of others as well as oneself (Epstude & Roesce, 
2008). 
Early studies of counterfactual regret occurred in laboratory settings where 
participants were asked to imagine alternatives to observed outcomes. Study findings, in 
general, supported the notion that people are more likely to regret the things they do, acts 
of commission, versus what they do not do, or acts of omission (Landman, 1987). As 
counterfactual thinking sparked more scholarly interest, investigators held increasing 
concern with the factors that motivated people to think in counterfactual terms. Taylor 
and Schneider (1989) found that upward counterfactual thinking had positive functions in 
helping participants adjust to unfortunate occurrences. Participants who mentally 
simulated alternative outcomes could build confidence in preparing for future challenges. 
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They could also find meaning in unfortunate events, repair bruised self-images, prepare 
for future challenges, and develop a regained sense of life mastery, overall. Relevant to 
this study, counterfactual thinking occurs in the aftermath of an undesirable event (Rye, 
Berry, Ali, and Draftary, 2008). Some researchers suggested that counterfactual 
processing is maladaptive. For example, Davis and Lehman (1995) posited that for 
traumatic events, counterfactual regret perpetuated suffering and grief associated with the 
unexpected loss of a loved one.  
Although findings on the functionality of counterfactual thinking have been 
heterogeneous, laboratory studies contain significant limitations. Often, empirical studies 
on this subject involved asking participants to read stories about victims who encountered 
misfortune. The duration, intensity, and consistency of counterfactual-regret content 
cannot be effectively measured with fictitious scenarios because they do not make an 
enduring impression on the participant. Moreover, the affective responses in a laboratory 
setting are significantly less vivid than with real-life happenings. Also, scant research 
exists on individual differences in counterfactual thinking. 
Early inquiries made some implicit assumptions that personality factors such as 
self-esteem and optimism might accompany varying degrees of counterfactual 
propensities. The collective research lacks breadth and depth, but some preliminary 
findings offer more support for personality factors as a significant consideration when 
assessing tendencies to imagine alternatives to real outcomes. (Taylor & Brown, 1988).  
Researchers have offered less support for linking intellectual and analytical 
abilities with the frequency or duration of counterfactual thinking (Roese & Olson, 2014). 
A well supported hypothesis is that exceptional events are more likely to be reimagined 
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in the minds of those who experience them. Wong and Weiner (1981) postulated that 
people are more likely to search for causal factors when something happens that violates 
their expectations. In their study, the researchers asked University of California, Los 
Angeles, students to imagine a scenario where their friend studied for a midterm 
examination but ultimately failed it. Participants were to generate questions about the 
event. Wong and Weiner categorized reactions according to content and the findings 
supported the tendency for people to ask more reevaluate questions when an event 
violates their expectations. Another factor that evokes counterfactual reasoning is the 
memorable nature of exceptional events. If the circumstances that preceded the event are 
also more accessible in memory, it is easier to rescript and recompose the event using 
counterfactual alternatives. This idea closely relates to the availability bias explored at 
length by Kahneman (2000). 
An engaging area of research, central to the current investigation, is how people 
counterfactually process traumatic events. The literature reveals important differences 
that challenge foundational assumptions about the mutability and content of 
counterfactual antecedents. Parents cling to the natural expectation that they will 
effectively protect their child from danger. When an accident or disease strikes, revoking 
this expectation, it is more likely for this population to compulsively ask causational 
questions. In the case of an accident, the cause is much more easily identified than in the 
diagnosis of cancer; a disease that modern science has not effectively grasped. Two 
studies involving bereaved parents offer a compelling finding: Bereaved parents do not 
follow the same mutability rules that most people do. Specifically, in studies where 
parents have lost their children to vehicle accidents or to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 
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participants did not demonstrate a greater inclination to replay and reimagine their actions 
leading to the event. They spent as much attention focusing on what they did not do 
which, in their minds, may have prevented their child’s death (Davis, Lehman, Silver, 
Wortman, & Ellard, 1996). 
Although the parents in the Davis, et. al. study (1996) did not perceive themselves 
to be directly responsible for their child’s death, their counterfactual thinking centered on 
what they could have controlled. In the study involving parents who lost their children to 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, the researchers conducted two interviews across an 18-
month time interval. During the second interview, researchers discovered that although 
counterfactual thinking persisted, the content of the counterfactual antecedents differed 
considerably from the original source of focus. Future field studies are needed to better 
understand persistence and consistency in counterfactual regret for bereaved populations. 
Counterfactual regret may help explain why parents of children with cancer 
experience regret as an additional layer of sorrow in their bereavement process. Two 
important constructs are made salient in the book, The Rational Imagination, by Byrne 
(2005). Chapter 5 vividly opens with an anecdotal reflection of media coverage 
immediately after the World Trade Center was destroyed by an act of terrorism. 
Remarkably, the thrust of every news channel involved a preoccupation with 
strengthened airport security as the central means by which the horrors of 911 could have 
been prevented. They provided much less emphasis on foreign relations between the 
United States and the Middle East or a root-cause analysis of terrorism in general. The 
question raised by the selectively narrow coverage follows: Why did airport security as a 
preventive factor predominate concerns over more complex sociopolitical factors? A post 
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hoc analysis of media content supported the hypothesis that in the aftermath of an 
unfortunate event, people focus on what is controllable, familiar, and easily defined. 
The causal factors of terrorism are difficult to conceive of and articulate because 
they are convoluted and foreign to most citizens of this country. Consequently, 
counterfactual thinking supersedes causational thinking. The common focus will hover 
on how baggage personnel might have or could have checked the hijackers’ luggage 
more carefully. Similarly, for parents of children with cancer, it is unfathomable to 
entertain the genetic or environmental influences that may have caused their precious 
offspring to become afflicted. Rather than focus on how or why the cancer occurred, de 
facto, parents will dwell on the treatments they should have or would have selected 
(including those they should have rejected or discontinued), while regret flourishes in the 
process of this counterfactual thinking. The shock and terror of 911 partially lies in the 
inexplicable randomness of the event. An occurrence of pediatric cancer is well described 
as follows: 
Cancer among children is not distributed with fairness or with equality. To those 
families affected by a child with cancer, it is seen as a cruel, unjust, and random 
assault. Justice appears, then, not in relationship to the disease, but rather to the 
treatment options. (Hord, Rehman, Anderson-Shaw, Hannon, & Schmidt, 2006, p. 
5556). 
In summary, counterfactual thinking finds fertile ground when negative 
experiences occur and, in retrospect, causational factors are deeply burrowed and not 
within cognitive reach. In tandem, the context in which the negative outcome transpires 
and the intensity of emotions experienced influence conterfactural regret. 
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One study emphasized context as a more reliable predictor of counterfactual 
regret (Mandel, 2003), whereas others asserted that the degree of negative emotions is the 
more dominant antecedent (Kahnemann & Miller, 1986). The current study aimed to 
corroborate the importance of situational context and emotional valance in counterfactual 
thinking, rather than debate which is more influential. 
Regret and Loss Adjustment 
Stakeholders often use bereavement and grief interchangeably, but they have a 
distinct difference. Bereavement broadly refers to the condition of having lost someone 
significant, in a generic sense. Grief encompasses the many cognitions and emotions that 
surround the loss that alter in form and intensity over time (Weiss, 2008). 
Parental grief has unique characteristics that researchers and writers alike have 
struggled to effectively characterize and capture. Author Finkbeiner (1996), after losing a 
20-year-old son in a train accident, dedicated study to better understanding the grief 
process in parents who lose their children. After a multitude of interviews with bereaved 
parents young and old, Finkbeiner (1996) shared the following reflection: 
The human mind is wired to find patterns and attach meanings, to associate things 
that are alike, to generalize from one example to another in short, to make sense 
of things … but children’s deaths make no sense, have no precedents, are part of 
no pattern; their deaths are unnatural and wrong. So parents fight their wiring, 
change their perspectives, and adjust to a reality that makes little sense (p. 5556).  
In many respects, the experience of bereaved parents have defied the foundational 
assumptions of earlier grief theories, particularly in the sequencing of assumed grief 
“stages,” as well as the time associated with the completion of grief. Early studies 
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perceived grief to be an acute but temporary condition followed by normal functioning 
(Lindemann, 1944). Popular stage-based theories (Kubler-Ross, 1969; Rando, 1984) 
depict grief processes as linear and predictable. More recent work in this area with 
middle-aged participants led to common acceptance that for bereaved parents, grief is not 
only highly individualistic but also an indefinite experience with indelible and long-
lasting social, psychological, and physiological consequences (Rogers, Floyd, Seltzer, 
Greenburg, & Hong, 2008; Sanders, 1998). 
Researchers have been unclear about how the distinct cancer experience impacts 
the grief process for bereaved parents. Unlike a sudden or accidental death, the death of a 
child to cancer is preceded with potentially long intermittent periods of hope, followed by 
fear and despair in an alternating rhythm. As the child moves in and out of remission and 
relapse phases, the parents must repeatedly adjust their expectations and coping 
mechanisms accordingly. These parents experience a dual morbidity that is unique to any 
other parental grief experience (Rosenberg, Baker, Syrjala, & Wolf, 2012). 
Counterfactual regret may be a magnifying glass in enlarging the complicated 
grief experience of parents of children with cancer. Parents of children with cancer will 
meet other families throughout prolonged stays in the hospital and frequent visits for 
outpatient services. In these exchanges, they will witness the recovery and survival of 
some children, and just as surely, the death and decline of others. When parents lose their 
own precious child, with whom they have a lifelong bond, they experience almost a 
gravitational pull to understand how and why their child died when other children with 
similar diagnoses went into a longer remission or were even pronounced cured. The 
inexplicable nature of this harsh truth can be self-occupying in a way that competes for 
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mental and spiritual space that might otherwise be used to rebuild one’s identify and 
future sense of purpose. 
A potential healthy outcome of the bereavement process is the gradual self-
acceptance of the parent who has lost their child to a devastating and incurable disease. 
Self-acceptance is a broad but foundational element in humanistic psychology that is 
essential to self-actualization and grief work (Bernard, 2013). On a very basic level, self-
acceptance involves the ongoing pursuit of self-love and understanding, despite 
deficiencies. Self-acceptance includes the desire and ability to become introspective on 
the totality of one’s life, with an honest inventory of personal strengths and shortcomings. 
Self-acceptance further encompasses a willingness to accept negative life events while 
preserving self-esteem and hope of a better future (Ryff & Singer 2001). Few studies on 
the bereavement process have isolated counterfactual regret as a predicate of a more 
difficult grief process. Grief researchers have broadly examined guilt by comparing the 
effects of self-blame and regret as central facets of guilt. 
For example, in one study of bereaved spouses with a mean age of 50, self-blame 
but not regret was a significant factor in grief complication, measured by higher levels of 
grief following loss, and prolonged grief symptoms over time (Stroebe et al., 2014). 
Although the centrality of regret in the Stroebe et al. (2014) study is of interest to the 
current investigation, the participants of interest are not comparable to the referenced 
study in their phase of life development or in familial relation to the deceased. To 
accentuate this point, the grieving spouse has likely anticipated the eventual separation as 
part of a normal life cycle. Further, they have not predictably functioned as the surrogate 
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decision maker for medical treatments that preceded their beloved one’s death, a reality 
that can fuel guilt and regret. 
Although death researchers prominently explored guilt, including child death, a 
great void exists in the literature on regret and parental bereavement. Researchers have 
rarely systematically studied sustained counterfactual regret in the bereavement process 
for parents who have lost children to cancer. Therefore, the avoidable tragedy of impaired 
self-acceptance compounded with the pain of losing a child, undergirds the importance of 
this study. 
Preventing and mitigating decisional conflict and its long-term companion, 
decisional regret, can facilitate the bereavement process: a lifelong reality in the 
aftermath of a significant loss. The subhypothesis of this study asserts the possibility that 
decisional regret may damage lower self-acceptance, reported on scales of well-being that 
incorporate measurements of self-acceptance, as captured by Ryff and Keys (1995). If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, efforts to dissipate decisional regret can open new pathways to 
spark and advance self-acceptance, thereby abetting the progression of healing after 
traumatic loss.  
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Chapter 3: Methodological Design/Data Collection and Analysis 
The present study attempted to evaluate whether bereaved parents of children 
with cancer experience statistically significant degrees of decisional regret when 
treatment options and risks, including unfavorable side effects, were not disclosed in a 
satisfactory manner. For the context of this investigation, perceived disclosure was self-
reported in selected surveys described in this section. In the first draft of the problem 
statement, it was subsumed that the oncologist assigned to care for the parent’s child 
would logically provide risk disclosure. The research question was revised to include 
more general disclosure, understanding that the continuum of oncology care would place 
the parents in contact with multiple clinicians over a length of time. The literature review 
process elucidated the complexity and fluidity of the clinical experience encountered by 
families navigating inpatient cancer treatments. Realistically, disclosure about treatment 
risks and side effects does not occur exclusively during a single conversation with a 
single point of contact. A second objective was to better understand if decisional regret, 
once detected, influenced parental-adjustment outcomes in the domain of self-acceptance, 
previously defined. 
The long-term and overarching aspiration of this work was to generate dialogue 
about patient-centered and progressive ways medical professionals can willingly share 
information, even very negative information, to improve decision-making satisfaction for 
parents of children who suffer from chronic diseases who are often treated experimentally 
or with treatments that have a concomitantly high morbidity rate. If decisional 
satisfaction can intentionally improve, parental bereavement will be characterized by 
higher rates of self-acceptance. 
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A quantitative approach was selected for three reasons.  First, the social constructs 
of interest are perceived information disclosure, self-reported decisional regret, and self-
reported self-acceptance. These concepts are cognitive and psychological states of being, 
experienced internally, rather than observable or demonstrable behaviors. Second, the 
independent variables in this study are open to a wide spectrum of interpretation. These 
variables can be easily misconstrued and misapplied in an open-interview setting. This is 
especially true because published coding systems do not exist to examine potential 
correlations between these manifested psychological states. A quantitative inquiry is 
proposed as the first step in this exploration because the design, by nature, offers a 
parametric structure to the examination of these states, guided by instrumentation that is 
well validated in the scientific community. The validation of the selected instruments 
suggests that operational definitions have been well tested over time among larger 
populations than this study can feasibly recruit. Third, this topic is sensitive and 
addresses the potential vulnerability of the population affected by cancer in a general 
sense. 
Quantitative studies present questions that permit participants to respond to 
questions in a liberal window of time and without being exposed to a face-to-face inquiry 
on topics that could evoke strong emotions. 
Sample Selection—Rationale and Procedure 
The population of interest in this study is bereaved parents of children with cancer 
who are between 30 days and 7,200 days post loss. In 2014, 1,960 U.S. children died 
from cancer (National Cancer Institute, 2018). Thus, about 4,000 parents who reside in 
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the United States are impacted by the death of their child in a given year. To derive an 
appropriate sample size, the following were considerations: 
1. Total number of parents impacted with childhood cancer in a single year 
2. The average sample size of previously conducted studies with similar research 
questions 
3. An a priori power analysis using a 95% confidence level and an interval margin of 
11. 
In the majority of studies reviewed, participants’ children were still living and 
actively receiving treatment. Consequently, the total available population of parents with 
children receiving treatment was much larger than the available population of bereaved 
parents in a single year. More than 12,000 new pediatric cancer cases were reported in 
2014 (National Cancer Institute, 2018). 
To determine the sample size appropriate to the present study, relative to similar 
research designs, the study entailed extracting a sample of six quantitative study 
protocols conducted in the United States. The sample size ranged from 56 to 193 with a 
mean sample size of 125.33 (see Table 1). However, in many cases, participants were all 
being treated in the same inpatient or outpatient hospital. Although using a smaller 
sample size of 92, the present study made efforts to expand the selection geographically, 
using electronic media as a method to publicize the study. 
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Table 1 
Study Quantitative Protocols 
Research setting N Citation 
Outpatient clinics at two cancer 
centers 
160 Jones et al. (2013) 
Acute hospital 118 Gagnon & Recklitis (2003).  
University of Florida 
Palliative care program 
140 Knapp et al., 2010  
Harvard Medical School 85 Lown, Clark, & Hanson (2009).  
Dana Farber Medical School 193 Mack et al. (2011)  
Children’s cancer clinic 56 Meert et al. (2008).  
 
An a priori power analysis was conducted for the present study using a widely 
available online tool (Creative Research Systems, 2012). The calculation determined that 
a minimum sample size of 85 events would be necessary to maintain a 95% confidence 
level and a confidence interval of 10.5. Study-recruitment efforts yielded a total of 92 
cases. 
The present study was granted approval by the Institutional Research Board of 
Nova Southeastern University. Convenience and snowball sampling were used to recruit 
prospective participants from a high-volume acute oncology clinic, as well as the online 
community. Participants were recruited from a children’s hospital in the southwestern 
United States after obtaining consent from the hospital’s institutional review board. The 
hospital is a prominent provider of oncology care in an urban area. Participants who 
consented to join the study were asked to voluntarily post the study flyer on their 
Facebook and Instagram pages (see Appendix A). 
Parents who participated in the study received a $35.00 Amazon gift card to 
compensate them for their time. Participants signed a consent form (see Appendices B 
60 
 
and C) describing the general nature of the study and associated risks. All participants 
were advised that they could terminate the study at any time. In advance of completing a 
battery of four surveys, all participants were asked to identify the date of their child’s 
death, the age of their child at the time of death, and to select, from a drop-down menu, 
the types of treatments their child participated in, such as surgery, chemotherapy, 
radiation, and other (see Appendix D). 
Data Collection, Management and Analysis Plan 
Quantitative data collection. Biographical data accrued to determine if 
demographic factors such as age, gender, or level of completed education would 
influence results. Survey data accrued for each independent and dependent variable in the 
study. All of the surveys were administered through a confidential software identified as 
questionpro.com. Each participant was identified by a random number in the software 
platform and the collected biographical and survey data were retained in the same 
environment. The following validated instruments were employed: The Decision Conflict 
Scale (see Appendix E), The Picker Patient Satisfaction Inventory (see Appendix F) , The 
Decision Regret Scale (see Appendix G), and the Ryff Scale of Psychological Well Being 
(see Appendix H). Each of the instruments was accompanied by a coding and scoring 
manual followed by the investigator in the interpretation of results. The author’s consent 
was obtained to use the instruments to completed the dissertation study. 
Decisional conflict in association with medical treatment decisions was measured 
with the Decisional Conflict Scale (see Appendix D; O’Connor, 2010). Parent perception 
of adequate information disclosure about medical treatment was measured with the 
Picker Patient Satisfaction Inventory (see Appendix F). High degrees of dissatisfaction 
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overall were calibrated with low satisfaction for information disclosure, as the majority of 
questions on the survey (seven of 15) are designed to gauge satisfaction with information 
sharing. Decisional regret was measured with the Decision Regret Scale (see Appendix 
G; O’Connor, 1995) and self-acceptance was measured with the Ryff Scale (see 
Appendix H; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 2001). The Decisional Conflict and 
Decision Regret scales both use a 100-point continuum. The upper and lower 25th 
percentiles reflect high conflict or high regret, respectively. The Ryff Scale uses six 
dimensions with a 6-point Likert-type scale. Higher scores on the dimension of self-
acceptance equate to higher well-being on this construct. 
Data interpretation and analysis. The variables in this study are continuous, 
nonextreme, and numerically quantifiable. A correlational study was employed because 
the goal of the statistical analysis was to compare the variables to identify any potential 
direction and magnitude of a linear relationship, negative or positive.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the research questions that guided this 
study, share the rationale behind the elected statistical tests that were employed, and 
report the results produced from these tests, including how they may support or refute the 
hypotheses. This chapter opens with a description of participant-recruitment approaches 
and data-collection methods. The frequencies of demographic variables involved in the 
study are presented to illustrate the data dispersion of participant gender, education, and 
race, while elucidating influences on results. 
This study was quantitative, using a battery of validated surveys to obtain 
information from bereaved parents of children with cancer who died at least 1 year prior 
to the study invitation. All surveys employed in this research project were previously 
used in clinical acute settings and referenced in similar studies that aspire to better 
understand patient satisfaction and medical decision making. 
Research Questions 
1. Do bereaved parents of children with cancer who report dissatisfaction with 
physician disclosure of information pertinent to medical-treatment risks and 
options also report higher levels of decisional conflict? The null hypothesis 
associated with this question is that no significant relationship will emerge 
between patient satisfaction and decisional conflict. The alternative hypothesis 
states that a significant relationship will emerge between problems with 
patient satisfaction and decisional conflict. 
2. Is there a positive relationship between self-reported levels of decisional 
regret in bereaved parents of children with cancer and decisional conflict? The 
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null subhypothesis states that no relationship will emerge between decisional 
conflict and decisional regret. The alternative subhypothesis asserts that a 
positive relationship will emerge between decisional conflict and decisional 
regret. 
3. Is there a negative correlation between levels of decisional regret and self-
acceptance in bereaved parents of children with cancer? The null 
subhypothesis states that no relationship will emerge between decisional 
regret and self-acceptance. The alternative hypothesis posits that higher levels 
of decisional regret will correlate with lower levels of self-reported self-
acceptance. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The investigator obtained consent from the institutional review board at a 
children’s hospital in a large urban area in the southwest United States. The consent 
permitted the investigator to send study-invitation letters to the parents of former 
deceased patients in the oncology unit. The collaborating institution is one of the largest 
providers of pediatric inpatient and outpatient oncology treatment in the region with 28 
inpatient beds and 20 outpatient infusion centers. Study invitation letters were sent in 
English and Spanish, as the study was open to participants who speak either language. All 
Spanish content was provided by a professional and licensed translation company. 
A total of 410 letters were mailed across a period of 1 month. Responding were 
28 English-speaking parents with inquiries and three Spanish-speaking parents, by e-mail 
or telephonically. From November through February of 2017–2018, 28 English-speaking 
parents completed and returned the consent form and the electronic surveys. Spanish 
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speaking parents did not respond to the study invitation. The survey responses were 
collected and routinely updated in a confidential software environment known as 
questionpro.com. 
Due to the quantitative nature of the study and the importance of having a 
sufficient sample size, the recruitment period extended past the initial anticipated time 
frame of three months. An additional nine parents agreed to post the study on their social-
media pages, primarily through their Facebook accounts, online chat rooms, and support-
group blogs. Hence, snowball sampling was incorporated to acquire a sample size 
sufficient to obtain statistical significance. From March through June, 64 referral parents 
completed all required survey instruments, resulting in a total of 92 English-speaking 
participants across a 6-month recruiting period. The study originally included responses 
from two married couples who referenced the same deceased child in their responses. 
Probability theory assumes that observations must be independent to ensure statistically 
accurate results. Therefore, only two of the four participants among the married couples 
were randomly elected to participate. This reduced the study sample size to a final total of 
92 participants. 
Study participants were asked to disclose personal demographic information that 
included their parental role (mother/father), race, and education level. Participants were 
also asked to identify the age of their child at diagnosis and at the time of death. The type 
of medical treatment employed, such as radiation or chemotherapy was also disclosed on 
the survey. 
Parental gender. The study was open to mothers and fathers of deceased children 
with cancer. Prior to death, all of the parents’ offspring were treated by a licensed 
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psychologist in the United States. The parents were the caregivers and primary decision 
makers in the medical-treatment process. 
The majority of participants were mothers at a rate of 70.7%, whereby fathers 
participated at a rate of 29.3%. The research questions do not specifically examine 
potential comparative differences in the responses between mothers and fathers, but an 
intentional effort was made to include a balanced composition of parent roles to better 
support the generalization of outcomes in support of the hypotheses (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Parental Gender 
 
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent 
 
Mother 65 70.7 70.7 70.7 
Father 27 29.3 29.3 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
 
Race. Although study participants represented multiple races collectively, the 
frequency data demonstrates that White and Latino parents were the predominant 
respondents. These two categories, combined, represented 68.4% of total participants (see 
Table 3). White parents participated at a rate of 7.6% higher than Latino parents, even 
though the participating hospital is geographically located in a community that has a 
large concentration of Latino populations. The third largest racial group included the self-
identification of “other,” at a response rate of 9.8%, followed by those who identify with 
multiple racial categories at a rate of 8.7%. Those who reported they are of Asian, 
African, and Hawaiian or Pacific Islander ancestry, individually, accounted for less than 
7% of all study participants (see Table 3). 
66 
 
Table 3 
Race 
 
Frequency Percent Valid percent 
Cumulative 
percent 
 
Latino 28 30.4 30.4 30.4 
Asian 4 4.3 4.3 34.8 
Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander 
2 2.2 2.2 37.0 
Black 6 6.5 6.5 43.5 
White 35 38.0 38.0 81.5 
Other 9 9.8 9.8 91.3 
More than 1 8 8.7 8.7 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
 
Education. The educational attainment of study participants was almost equally 
distributed between the categories of high school, some college, and bachelor’s degree, 
with nearly a third of the participants self-identifying in these categories, respectively. 
Close to 11% of participants reported having a graduate degree and they were grouped 
with the bachelor’s-degree group (see Table 4). 
Table 4 
Highest Level of Education Achieved 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
High school 30 32.6 32.6 32.6 
Some college 27 29.3 29.3 62.0 
Bachelor’s degree 25 27.2 27.2 89.1 
Graduate degree 10 10.9 10.9 100.0 
Total 92 100.0 100.0  
 
Age at diagnosis and death. The study included parents of children from age 
zero to 25 years old. The actual respondents included parents of children between zero to 
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17 years of age at the time of diagnosis, and between zero and 24 years of age at death. 
The average age of diagnosis for the children of parents in the study was calculated to be 
7.05 years with a standard deviation of 4.97. The mean age of death was 9.22 with a 
standard deviation of 5.34. The Childhood Cancer Fact Library (2018), reported that the 
average age of onset for a pediatric cancer diagnosis is 8 years old. Study findings are 
consistent with this trend (see Tables 5). 
Table 5 
Child Age at Diagnosis and Death in Years  
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median N Minimum/Maximum 
Age at Diagnosis 7.05 4.97 6.50 92 < 1year /17 years 
Age at Death 9.22 5.34 9.00 92 < 1year /24 years 
 
Demographic Factors 
The descriptive statistics did not yield any significant correlations for the 
categories of parent gender, race, or education levels. Although gender and race were 
skewed toward White female, the dispersion was sufficient, in relation to the sample size. 
Overall, demographic data did not influence the findings in a statistically significant 
manner. In the absence of identified covariates presented by the continuous variable of 
time, measured by age of death or diagnosis, no multiple regression study was performed. 
Equivocally, the group variables of age, race, and gender were not further analyzed. 
Data Analysis and Results 
SPSS, version 24, was used to perform all statistical analyses for this study with 
Pearson product-moment correlations conducted between all variables. A correlation test 
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was selected because most of the variables in the study were continuous. The first 
hypothesis was tested by calculating a correlation coefficient for the relationship between 
parent satisfaction with physician disclosure of information (measured by the Picker 
Inventory, with higher scores reflecting more problems; see Appendix F) and reported 
decisional conflict (measured by the Decision Conflict Scale, with higher scores 
connoting more decisional conflict; see Appendix E). The resulting correlation was 
significant. A positive relationship emerged between these two variables whereby r(92) 
= .866, and p < .0005 (see Table 7). This outcome is consistent with the primary 
hypothesis; more problems with physicians’ disclosures aligned with greater decisional 
conflict. This finding supports the inference that bereaved parents of children with cancer 
experience higher levels of decisional conflict when they report higher levels of 
dissatisfaction with physicians’ disclosure of information. 
The second hypothesis (2a) statistical test assessed a potential relationship 
between decisional conflict and decisional regret, also using the Pearson product-
moment-correlation coefficient. A positive correlation also emerged. Although not part of 
the original hypotheses, problems with physician disclosure of information also had a 
significant relationship to decisional regret, r = .693, n = 92, and p  = .01. For Hypothesis 
2a, the results suggested that participants who reported high levels of decisional conflict 
were more likely to equivocally report higher levels of decisional regret (see Table 8). 
To test Hypothesis 2b, a Pearson correlation was employed to determine the 
possible association between decisional regret and self-acceptance. Once more, a 
statistically significant result was produced with a negative correlation of r(90) = -.666, 
and p < .0005. These results align with Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that decisional 
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regret would result in lower self-acceptance. Decisional conflict correlated with self-
acceptance whereby r(90) = -.837, n = 02, and p < .0005. 
Conclusion 
The research questions for this study were addressed using correlational statistical 
analyses for each hypothesis. Findings indicated a statistically positive correlation 
between problems of satisfaction with physician disclosure and high degrees of 
decisional conflict. 
Similarly, a demonstrated positive correlation emerged between decisional 
conflict and decisional regret, as expected. A negative correlation arose between 
decisional conflict and self-acceptance as well as between decisional regret and self-
acceptance. The next chapter of this manuscript will address the implications of the 
findings in the context of the research questions, as well as recommendations for further 
inquiry. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Preface 
The study under discussion was designed and executed to fulfill the requirements 
towards the completion of a doctoral degree in Conflict Analysis and Resolution.  
Scholars have asserted that conflict studies, in broad and universal sense, are most often 
limited to conflict between social groups, social categories, or entire nations, versus 
conflicts between individuals or within the mind of individuals (Schellenberg, 1996).   
The variables in the present study examine micro-conflict in the communication between 
oncologists and parents of children with cancer, e.g., information disclosure from the 
oncologist to the parent as surrogate decision maker.  Oncologists are very much part of a 
social group of health care practitioners with established beliefs, values, and normative 
behaviors.  Oncologists exist in significant numbers. A recent census in 2016, counted 
14,639 licensed oncologists in the United States (www.statistica.com). Oncologists 
present a social group that routinely interact with each other in conference venues, 
through scholarly review of publications, and via continuous professional development.   
The social cohesion model is comprehensively addressed by Turner in Tajfel’s 
revisitation of intergroup theories (2010).  In this work, the distinction between social 
group and social category rests on whether individual with common characteristics have 
routine interaction with each other in a way that promotes an attraction and common 
bond.  In the same publication, the social identity model is depicted as a more loosely 
constructed definition of social group, in that the group need not be interdependent so 
long as a continuous attraction mutually exists.  This latter point compatibly supports this 
investigator’s orientation to parents of children with cancer as a social group with a well-
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shaped identity and not merely a social category. Social networks serve to solidify this 
common identity by providing emotional support and the constant archiving of a shared 
experience.  
In understanding how social media reduces social distance, it may be argued that 
parents of children with cancer represent a larger group of health consumers that feel 
interdependent in their quest for affirmation. (Henderson, Churchill, King, Rothschild, 
Lohser,et al., 2009).  This group, in facing their vulnerable state and circumstances, 
repeatedly turn to online platforms to help navigate the best care for their child.   
Parents of children with cancer negotiate the best available medical treatment 
throughout the duration and persistence of a condition requiring the care of a physician.  
Studies on negotiation and particularly compromise, identify factors that are strongly 
relevant to the practice of making medical decisions (Chapman & Sonnenberg, 2000).  
Consequently, the problem of making satisfactory medical decisions is only an 
intrapersonal conflict absent the identification of participant as member of a group.  The 
detection of patterns and themes across the spectrum of this social group strengthen the 
assertion that decisional conflict in medical decision making is a larger social 
phenomenon that has received insufficient attention in all disciplines concerned with 
decisional satisfaction and ethical practices in health care.  This studies’ results, outlined 
in the previous chapter, suggest that correlations between physician disclosure and 
decisional conflict in parents of children with cancer, may be replicated beyond the realm 
of cancer treatment and the negotiations that transpire in the treatment process.  While 
this dissertation was in an early draft form, a study with nearly identical variables, albeit 
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different instruments of measurement, was being finalized.  The results will be discussed 
in depth. 
The present chapter provides an overview of the results of each hypothesis test 
followed by a discussion of the connection of those results to the empirical literature and 
of the clinical implications.  In a scholarly spirit, there is a commitment to providing 
attention not only to studies that support the current results, but also to those that may 
refute or contradict the correlations that were determined. Finally, the chapter will 
conclude with limitations and recommendations for future exploration. 
Primary Hypothesis - Overview 
The primary research question in this study was the result of the following line of 
inquiry: Does decisional conflict about medical treatment occur at greater rates when 
bereaved parents of children report higher levels of dissatisfaction with physician 
disclosure of treatment risks and side effects. The study results yielded a positive 
correlation between these two variables whereby r(90)=.866, and p < .0005. 
Studies that support the primary alternative hypothesis 
At core, the present study has been concerned with the patient or parents’ 
perspective on information disclosure in relation to their psychological adjustment and 
response.  The focus is on the parents’ experience versus the physicians’ account of the 
communication surrounding treatment process and decisions.  The majority of studies 
looking at medical decision making in pediatric cancer, have more broadly measured the 
concept of shared decision making and all this may entail, without isolating specific 
communication elements embedded within that construct.  In contrast, the investigator 
and author of this manuscript has elected to magnify the influence of information 
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disclosure, apart from active or inactive involvement in decisional process. With that 
fundamental difference in mind, there is still an arguable amount of support for the 
results yielded in the current study. 
After sifting through two decades of research that altogether omitted the 
phenomena of regret and decisional conflict in parents of children with cancer, the 
investigator was delighted to encounter a recent examination by Hong et al. (2016) that 
included both regret and decisional conflict in a different population – children with 
significant ear defects.  
In this study, parents were undergoing surgical consultations for cosmetic ear 
surgery for their children.  Decisional conflict was negatively correlated with reported 
parental involvement in the decision making process. Regret was also negatively 
correlated, but at a lower level of statistical significance.  These dependent variable 
outcomes are consistent with the present study where both decisional conflict and regret 
were influenced by interactions between physician and parent with decisional conflict 
having a stronger influence than regret r=.866 and r=.693, respectively.  The retrieved 
study included the administration of a survey to the surgeons where there was no reported 
significance between parental involvement and decisional conflict. The latter result 
suggests a lack of calibration in how parents view their decisional satisfaction in 
comparison to how physicians perceive the same construct (Hong, Gorodzinsky, Taylor, 
& Chorney, 2016).   
In a larger study with 429 participants, the parents’ perception of presented 
treatment ”options” was negatively correlated with decisional conflict. Parents who 
reported being provided with clear treatment options reported less decisional conflict 
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(Bowland, Kryworuchko, Saarimake, & Lawson, 2017).  These collective findings 
promote the value of collaborative decision making practices where treatment 
information is salient and communication objectives are established early in the 
prognosis. 
Studies that challenge current findings 
An underline assumption of the current study design and political inspiration is 
that physicians have an ethical obligation to provide the full disclosure of treatment risks 
and side effects in the spirit of do no harm.   
A counterpoint to this discussion may be that physicians use their best discretion 
to balance when unfavorable information may be harmful in itself, if not disseminated 
incrementally or at a slower pace.  Wells (2012) acknowledges that physicians may elect 
not to address the full gauntlet of medication side effects out of concern that it may 
produce a nocebo effect.  A nocebo effect is associated with negative symptoms that 
result when a patient develops anxieties and expectancies in association with something 
unpleasant such as nausea, pain, dizziness, etc.   
One of the strongest contenders to the primary alternative hypothesis results in 
this study, was a protocol authored by Stewart, Grim, & Kelly (2012). In this mixed 
method investigation using semi-structured interviews, researchers looked at decision 
making strategies employed by parents of children undergoing cancer treatment.  They 
took into account family and clinician support systems as independent variables. 
Dependent variables involved a parents’ overall satisfaction with their decision. The 
study findings indicate that parents were vigilantly concerned with making the right 
decision and were profoundly aware of the trust their children placed in them.  
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Ultimately, they were strongly convicted that they made the right choice about their 
child’s treatment. Several quotes from the interview transcripts were included to illustrate 
this sense of self-trust, a finding that is disparate with the current study.   
The attributional factors in this study were global in nature and closely linked to the 
parents support network.  A few caveats should be considered when comparing the result 
variances.   
First, self-selected participation in any study can incidentally solicit a study 
sample that naturally has a stronger support network, hence the available time comfort 
level for participation.  Second, the study design examined the independent variables 
using open ended questions versus a quantitative survey.  The transcript coding may have 
been indifferent to themes that were illuminated in the present study.  Third, all children 
of the parents interviewed were still living and an element of hope and faith was strongly 
at play.  There may not have been sufficient time for parental reflection on potential 
negative health outcomes.   
Finally, the study authors admittedly confront the importance of treatment 
uncertainty. “Uncertainty made the decision making more difficult and intensified its 
impact”. (page 422). 
Treatment uncertainty is a variable that was not addressed in the current study, but 
it may prove to be very powerful in its own right, possibly strengthening the argument for 
more physician disclosure to mitigate uncertainty. Conversely, some diagnoses and 
prognoses accompany more uncertainty concerning disease behavior and progression.  
When the uncertainty threshold is high, it is possible that physician disclosure or lack 
thereof, may be comparatively inconsequential.  
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While re-reading my literature review, a close colleague entertained the notion 
that some parents may be so emotionally distraught over their child’s cancer prognosis, 
with limited ability to cope, they will experience decisional conflict no matter what the 
oncologist communicates or how.  This evoked my further consideration of coping skills 
as a potential covariate. 
The present study design documented significant pre-existing mental health 
conditions in the pre-screening phase.  The purpose of this data gathering was to have an 
awareness of the prevalence of such conditions from a participant protection standpoint 
and to obtain a reasonable confidence that the population was not unduly afflicted by 
mental health issues.  The presence or absence of such conditions was generally balanced 
in relation to the general population.  Although the literature review in this study was not 
concerned with polarities or deficiencies in coping skills in the sample examined, this 
may be a reasonable assertion to consider in future studies.  
Research Implications 
Moving toward stronger collaboration 
The aggregate literature and study findings overall, serve to remind the principal 
investigator that effective communication, including information disclosure, between 
parents and doctors requires a two way commitment and responsibility. Parents who 
know what questions to ask and how to present them, may more effectively solicit 
information, even from a physician who is reluctant to disclose the summative risks.  
When this study initially commenced, the investigator admittedly was more heavily 
concerned with the physician’s neglect of initiating such disclosure.  
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In retrospect, there lies the greatest promise in making communication a shared 
responsibility.  This includes the teaching of communication skills, specific to medical 
treatments, to both oncologists and parents of sick children.  Conversations about 
treatment pros and cons must be re-evaluated and checked for clarify, numerous times 
over the course of treatment protocols.   
Newer studies, within the last 5 years, are discovering that most communication 
gaps occur during the early treatment phase period when parents may be too emotional to 
fully comprehend treatment guidance while oncologists are simultaneously avoiding the 
release of Pandora’s Box.  The development of a “100 day talk” in accompaniment with a 
conversation tool, may be a practical checkpoint for ensuring that parents have the 
needed time and space to vocalize any emergent dissatisfaction with the quantity and 
quality of information shared (Feraco, Gagne, Brand, & Sullivan, 2018).  
In the field of conflict analysis and resolution, collaboration is heralded as a form 
of conflict prevention and mitigation that is preferable to negotiation.  Moreover, 
effective collaboration contains pre-set list of premises required to set the stage for 
meaningful collaboration. It is imperative to make room for divergent viewpoints and 
values while incorporating acknowledgment of each parties’ strengths. (Folger, Poole, & 
Stutman, 2009).  Although parents may struggle with numeracy as previously discussed, 
they carry the strength of knowing their child and family dynamics in a way that the 
oncologist cannot.  In sum, the clinical implications discussed here are buttressed by 
principles of sound collaboration borrowed from conflict studies. 
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Clinical Implications and Recommendations 
The finding of this study and those that preceded it, point to the necessity of 
improving both the process and associated resources for relaying unfavorable treatment 
information to parents of children with cancer.   
The importance of bilateral communication cannot be overstated in this endeavor 
in that parents need to be educated on how to communicate concerns with their 
oncologist just as much as oncologists need to be trained on approaches for sharing bad 
news. The composite literature findings, combined with the results of the current study, 
suggest that future communication practices should have a three pronged mission. First 
the presence of intense emotions in both patients and physicians should be accepted and 
normalized in the collaborative process.  Several theorists have described the benefit of 
incorporating the acknowledgement of patient emotions as part of the communication and 
decision making process (Marshall, A. & Smith, R., 2005; Yakely, Hale, Johnston, 
Kirtchuk, & Shoenberg, 2014).  Second, communication plans must be crafted differently 
for the needs of patients and families in acute pediatric settings versus adult oriented 
environments (Wolf and Frierdich et. al., 2014).  Thirdly, communication training 
programs for both physician and patient (or caregivers) should include a framework for 
integrated decision making.  In brief, integrated decision making includes the 
incorporation of patient values for quantity versus qualify of life, as well as 
predetermined expectations and agreements for who will hold the final authority over a 
decision based on the nature and timing of the treatment factors (Chapman & 
Sonnenberg, 2000; Flynn & Wienfurt, et al., 2008).   
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Secondary Hypothesis- Overview 
The secondary research question in this study introduced the following line of 
inquiry: Does the presence of decisional conflict positively correlate with decisional 
regret in bereaved parents of children with cancer?   
The results demonstrated support for the secondary alternative hypothesis (H2).  
Increased level of decisional regret was related to measured levels of decisional conflict 
in the context of medical treatment elections.   
Studies that support the alternative sub-hypothesis 
In the absence of any formal statistical analysis, it can be intuitively inferred that 
multiple and diverse factors may contribute to decisional regret in parents of children 
with cancer.  The present study design did not measure individual coping and cognitive 
skills that may increase resiliency to regret. An enduring curiosity, therefore, is whether 
other regret factors may outweigh or supersede the importance of physician disclosure of 
information and decisional conflict.  
The answer to this question is yielded by a recent study involving two prominent 
cancer treatment centers that specialize in pediatric populations. Investigators conducted 
a multivariate aggression analysis on quality of treatment information, parent education, 
parent race, desired involvement in treatment decisions, level of acceptance of child’s 
diagnosis, parents’ communication skills, and time between diagnosis and survey 
dissemination (Mack, Cronin, & Kang, 2016).  The findings are consistent with the 
present study in that parent education did not influence decisional regret.  In addition, 
quality of treatment information had a significant impact on decisional regret.  Race was 
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also found to positively correlate with decisional regret, a factor that was not detected in 
the study at hand.   
Studies that challenge current findings 
Decision regret as become an increasingly common construct in study protocols 
involving pediatric populations and their parents or caregivers. Consequently, studies that 
challenge the present results would optimally do so by introducing other factors leading 
to the experience of regret in the same demographic when placed in similar situations and 
circumstances.  
In a metacognitive analysis of studies using the Decision Regret Scale (the main 
instrument used in the present study design), factors such as adverse physical symptoms 
were cited as contributing to higher reported scores of decisional regret (Perez, Menear, 
Brehaut, & Legare, 2016).  The research questions in the present study exclude 
consideration of the child’s emotional and physical state near the end of life, which 
reflect the presence or absence of suffering to a subjective degree.  A possible 
consideration is that the parents’ witnessing of suffering is the more profound influencer 
of decision regret, in comparison to decision conflict alone. 
In an experimental study of parents with children who suffer from inflammatory 
bowel disease, or juvenile idiopathic arthritis, parents rated their decisional experience as 
either self-led, physician-led, or shared.  There were no differences in reported decisional 
conflict nor decisional regret among these three groups, a finding that appears 
counterintuitive to the majority of studies outlined throughout this manuscript.  
The surprising result is what occurred when the parents were surveyed again, 
based on perceptions of physician ‘engagement’ which differs from decisional 
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involvement.  When the same group of participants considered whether the physician 
used language they could understand, was available for their questions, and so forth, there 
were statistically significant differences in both decisional conflict and decisional regret.  
Low physician engagement negatively correlated with high decisional conflict and regret.  
Investigators concluded that being able to place trust in the physician managing care, was 
more predictive of decisional satisfaction than level of involvement in the decision 
process itself (Lipstein, et.al., 2016).  The results, if replicated in an oncology setting, 
suggest that it’s not how much information doctors comprehensively divulge to parents, 
but more so whether the information is presented intelligibly and compassionately. The 
stylistics become the dominant factor in decisional satisfaction.  When reflecting on the 
questions used in the Picker Patient Experience Questionnaire (PPE), it may be important 
to critically re-evaluate some of the questions from a physician engagement standpoint.  
Moreover, the study design included adjustments for parents’ stress level, an added level 
of analysis that has not been employed in other studies. From a methodology standpoint, 
it is good to know more about the rationale behind controlling for stress and the 
reliability and validity associated with doing so. 
A final concept of interest, comparative to the influence of decisional conflict- 
generically speaking, is whether the parent’s treatment decisions fit into the framework of 
how they may define good parenting.  The parent’s emphasis on the role of good parent 
is consistent with the importance of role identity in understanding what may be valid 
objectives and aspirations in the face of conflict ( Sandole, Byrne, Standole-Saroste, & 
Senehi, 2008).  Good parenting was not discussed or analyzed in the present study 
protocol, but at least one study has sought to define what this means for parents who elect 
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to complete a do not resuscitate agreement (DNR) or alternatively, enroll their children in 
a phase one experimental trial.  Both groups define good parenting to include an attempt 
to alleviate their child’s suffering.  The commitment to bringing a sense of comfort to 
their children was a significant theme in how parents viewed their own decision making 
process (Maurer, et.al, 2010).   
It may be narrow sighted, therefore, to discuss decisional regret in parents without 
first acknowledging the overwhelming and perhaps universal instinct to maintain good 
parenting, despite the grim possibility of losing your child. 
Research Implications  
When the current research question: Does decisional conflict influence decisional 
regret(?) is juxtaposed with the question; What are the myriad factors that influence 
decisional regret (?), the former question may prove to be over-simplistic within the 
scheme of medical decision making and its infinite complexity. Future research protocols 
should view decisional regret as a viable factor to be measured along a gradient of other 
factors such as preexisting anxiety.  The end result is to determine the strength of 
decisional conflict in relation to competing contributors of regret, as there may be 
considerable interplay between all factors. 
Clinical Implications and Recommendations 
The clinical implications of decisional regret rest on future research findings that 
can parse out which factors leading to decisional regret are most significant and thus 
deserving of the most attention and resources.  Learning that physician engagement is a 
more powerful predictor of decisional regret than physician led decision making, suggests 
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that communication training for oncologists needs to center more around the effective 
delivery of information versus who is leading the flow of information.   
Tertiary Hypothesis – Overview 
The third alternative hypothesis in this study asserts that decisional regret 
negatively influences self-acceptance. The study results yielded a negative correlation of 
r(90) = -.666, and p < .0005. Although not part of the original research question, 
decisional conflict correlated with self-acceptance whereby r(90) = -.837, n = 02, and p 
< .0005.   
Pillay (2016) describes self-acceptance as embracing our total capacities, both 
good and bad, in such a way that we are more resilient to criticism whether internal or 
external.  Self-acceptance was further developed by Carol Ryff as one of the primary 
elements of social well- being.  Self-acceptance is not synonymous with self-esteem. The 
negative influence of decisional regret on self-acceptance should be considered with 
caution because self-acceptance is well formed in early adulthood and is negatively 
impacted by depression and other mental disorders that may preclude a pediatric cancer 
diagnosis, or otherwise be precipitated by it.   
Parents of children with cancer, the participants in this study, do not present a blank slate 
when confronted with medical decisions. Support networks, emotional and intellectual 
capacities, and overall coping mechanisms can dominate the experience of decisional 
conflict and regret more so than physician communication as the former resources are 
aggregately developed over a lifespan.   
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Studies that support the alternative sub-hypothesis 
There is a general consensus that people with strong self-acceptance can better 
modulate their emotions by suppressing negative beliefs and bouncing back more quickly 
from disappointment and failures.  
Studies that challenge current findings 
Study participants who had a low degree of self-acceptance in advance of their 
child’s diagnosis, may have been more influenced by decisional conflict and regret than 
those who had a high degree of self-acceptance before managing their child’s illness and 
associated treatment.  There is no way to capture this information for comparative 
purposes, as one cannot predict the future state of health.  It suffices to underscore that 
not all study participants entered the survey with the same coping strengths and abilities 
that are tied to strong self-acceptance.  Studies that correlate mild depression or other 
mental illnesses to decisional regret, may diminish the importance of the present study’s 
findings.  One study found a significant relationship between mild depression, self-blame 
and decisional regret.  A weakness of the study is that the decisional process was based 
on hypothetical considerations versus real life choices (Kraines, Krug, & Wells, 2017).  
Another study found a significant relationship between major depressive disorder and 
counterfactual thinking- a significant factor in the experience of regret (Howlett & 
Paulus, 2013).  The biographical data collected in the present research design, included a 
pool of self-identified depressed parents.  A person’s general state of psychological 
health is a stronger determinant of self-acceptance than a single event, decision, or season 
of calamity. Consequently, decisional regret may not be the primary culprit behind low 
85 
 
self-acceptance.  The real answer may lie behind the depression that is accompanied by 
decisional regret. 
Research Implications 
Future studies on regret and self-acceptance may have stronger statistical 
sensitivity if persons with mental disorders are excluded or if the presence of such 
disorders is adjusted for in the final analyses.  In a relatively small sample size of 92, 
even a few depressed participants may potentially inflate the mean variance. 
Clinical Implications and Recommendations 
The Ryff Scale of Well Being may be a useful instrument in informing clinicians 
about the depth and type of resources parents will need to make satisfactory medical 
decisions. Parents with low self-acceptance may be prone to procrastinate or over 
ruminate on decisions pertaining to their child’s treatment.  The medical team can 
mitigate this possibility by offering more frequent emotional support and intervention. 
Applications in the Field of Conflict Resolution 
The results of the present study demonstrate support for improved communication 
training that will lead to shared decision making between pediatric oncologists and the 
parents they interact with.  The research data has been collected from a narrowly defined 
population within the parameters of recalling what occurred in an acute medical setting. 
However, the phenomena of self-acceptance, counterfactual regret, and post-decisional 
conflict has broader implications for improved training in multiple professions- 
particularly roles that involve crisis response and intervention.  In the introductory 
chapter of this paper, it was noted that a diagnosis of pediatric cancer is a catastrophic 
event.  Similarly, police officers, paramedics, and firefighters, and military personnel are 
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called upon to manage catastrophic events for which they have limited control over. 
These agents of community service are faced with life altering decisions made under 
stressful and less than optimal time constraints.  The decision to end or save someone’s 
life is often made in a fraction of a second, with a lifetime of emotional consequences.  
Klein, Zapotosky, and White (2012), assert that police officers who kill in the line of duty 
are faced with years of grief, guilt, and alienation that are exacerbated by public scrutiny 
and investigations concerning their potential culpability.  The presence of guilt and social 
alienation are elements associated with compromised self-acceptance, as examined in 
bereaved parents who are no less haunted by the difficult decisions they had to make.  
Future work in conflict resolution should be directed towards re-writing the script for 
training so that individuals in high stress roles can do some of the mental work necessary 
to normalize emotional responses to difficult decisions.   
The implementation of such training may hold some promise in mitigating the painful 
regret that arises when difficult decisions lead to unfortunate outcomes. 
Limitations 
The current study is characterized by multiple limitations.  Generalizability of 
results is reduced due to the small sample size and the limited diversity in the study 
recruits, both ethnically and in terms of gender.  Due to the potential vulnerability of the 
population under study and the observance of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1992  (HIPAA) which governs privacy laws for patients,  it was 
logistically challenging and time intensive to gain access to multiple pools of bereaved 
parents beyond the southwestern United States.   
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Chapter 3 outlines the difficulty of this process in greater detail.  This study also 
did not require information about socioeconomic status nor religious faith.   
These are demographics that may have added depth of insight into behavioral 
patterns and variances.  For example, parents who identified themselves religious as 
opposed to non-religious might score differently on decisional conflict and decisional 
regret in line with a particular life perspective.  
Another study limitation is the potential external factors, aside from satisfaction 
with the quality of medical information shared, that may influence satisfaction with 
treatment choices.  For example, the quality of medical insurance and benefits accessible 
to the parent of a child with cancer may limit the range of treatment choices available, 
thus introducing an external source of stress that is not visible or detected with the 
instruments used in the current study design.  
Social support outside of the hospital setting may also play a significant role in improving 
decisional satisfaction, in a way that confounds with attributing decisional dissatisfaction 
as an exclusive byproduct of the patient-physician communication dynamic.  
On a final note, the current study is limited in the depth of information that can be 
elicited in a survey alone.  One study on patient-physician conflict made use of 
videography to code and measure non-verbal communication that was associated with 
conflict (Leblanc & Kenny, et.al, 2009).  The video capture of this information made it 
possible to measure important nuances in the discord such as proportional talk time, 
volume of voice, abruptness of explanations, etc.  This presents a richer and more layered 
form of communication analyses than the current study aspired to within the parameters 
of available time and funds.   
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It would be interesting to re-test the first null hypothesis in this study using 
videotaped narratives from the population of interest, as a form of qualitative research. 
The presence or absence of conflict could be coded based on non-verbal gestures, tonality 
of oral communication, and other more multi-dimensional aspects of communication that 
are easily missed within the context of survey questions alone. 
As with any study, there may be considerable variations in the way that 
investigators define, operationalize, and measure very similar constructs.  A lack of 
standard vernacular in decision theory may complicate or thwart the opportunity for 
making meaningful comparisons in research findings, and replicating positive effects 
with newer populations or expanded samples.  As previously emphasized, regret can be 
categorized and explained in relation to both outcome and process, and in relation to 
other or self.  Therefore, understanding the influence of regret on other cognitive and 
behavioral functions is potentially impaired when terms and measurements are not 
effectively determined. 
Final Reflections 
The work in conflict resolution, past, present, and future, remains challenging in 
its vastness and diversity. When selecting this dissertation topic and advocating for its 
importance in the year 2014, I was preoccupied with the concern that due to its low 
visibility in the media and the social sciences, medical decision making would receive 
mild if any interest from academic and medical audiences.  Conflict related topics are so 
often spurred by world events and the media attention appropriated to such events.  I 
nearly departed from the topic in favor of something underscored in my courses and well 
discoursed by scholars in the field. The narrowness of my study paled in comparison to 
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conflicts surrounding wars, genocide, violence, ethnic tensions, and police brutality, 
when evaluating the importance of a topic with metrics of broad and longitudinal world 
impact. The difficulty in recruiting participants further led to me to question the direction 
of my studies and the feasibility of my undertaking. Yet, it was fascinating to see the 
slow emergence of studies on medical decision making, rise between 2016 and 2018 on 
this widely muted topic. The compass behind my continuance was anchored in my belief 
that conflict resolution, as both art and science, should fundamentally improve quality of 
life, for the individual, the family, the community, the state, the nation, and the world. 
While relatively few will experience a catastrophic illness, nobody is immune to failing 
health nor the anticipation of death.   
Successfully defending my dissertation served as the final affirmation that my studies 
took me down a path that I believe will open more widely for future travelers, whether 
they be academics, practitioners, or just a person trying to make sense out of human 
suffering.   
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Appendix A: Study Recruitment Flyer 
Are you a parent who has suffered the loss of a 
child from cancer? 
 
 
 
A dissertation research study is recruiting voluntary participants. 
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The study is focused on understanding how parents make treatment 
decisions, and how communication between parents and doctors can be 
improved. 
 
If selected to participate, you will complete 4 brief multiple choice surveys 
about your experience with cancer treatment, and one brief open-ended 
response. Your time commitment is approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes.  
 
You can complete the surveys using your home computer, laptop, or tablet. 
 
Your responses are strictly confidential. 
 
You will receive a $35.00 Amazon gift card for your participation. 
 
Principal investigator: Danielle Sperandeo 
Please contact dsperandeo@yahoo.com for more information or to join the study, call 
909-286-0002. 
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Appendix B: Invitation Letter and Consent Form—English 
 
 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled ““ 
Funding Source: None. 
IRB protocol #: 
Principal investigator 
Danielle De Santis Sperandeo, Master of Education 
10751 Spyglass Dr. 
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 
909-286-0002 
For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: 
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB) 
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790 
IRB@nsu.nova.edu 
Site Information Address 
 
Introduction 
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted for a dissertation at 
Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Before agreeing to participate 
in this research study, it is important that you read the following explanation of this 
study. This document describes the purpose, procedures, benefits, risks, discomforts, and 
precautions of the program. Also described is your right to withdraw from the study at 
any time. No guarantees or assurances can be made as to the results of the study. 
 
What is the study about? 
 
Why are you asking me? 
 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
The length and depth of the potential interview depends on the degree to which you wish 
to participate. You have the right to refuse or prematurely terminate your involvement in 
this study at any time. I will only terminate your participation if I determine that you are 
in danger or pose a threat to another. 
 
Is there any audio or video recording? 
 
What are the dangers to me? 
 
Possible risks and discomforts may include: 
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“If you have any questions or concerns about the research, your research rights, or have a 
research-related injury or problem, please contact Danielle Sperandeo at the number 
above. You may also contact the IRB at the numbers indicated above with questions as to 
your research rights. 
 
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study? 
There are no direct benefits by participating in this study. 
 
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything? 
There are no costs to you or payments made for participating in this study. 
 
How will you keep my information private? 
All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless the law requires 
disclosure. Your identity as a participant will not be disclosed to any unauthorized 
persons; only the researchers and the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review 
Board (the committee that approved this research project) will have access to the research 
materials, which will be kept in a locked safe for a period of 60 months. Any references 
to your identity that would compromise your anonymity will be removed or disguised 
prior to the preparation of the research reports and publications. 
 
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study? 
Participation in this study is voluntary; refusal to participate will involve no penalty. You 
are free to withdraw consent and discontinue participation in this project at any time and 
for any reason. Questions concerning this research will be answered by the researcher 
before, during, and after the study. Any information or contribution you make to the 
study will be kept for 60 months, but will be excluded at your request. 
 
Other Considerations: 
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate 
to your willingness to continue to participate, I will provide you with this information. 
 
Voluntary Consent by Participant: 
By signing below, you indicate that 
•this study has been explained to you 
•you are at least 18 years of age 
•you understand written English and have read this document or it has been read to 
you 
•your questions about this research study have been answered 
•you have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions in 
the future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury 
•you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel 
questions about your study rights 
•you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it 
•you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled “The inter and intra 
departmental conflict among Black police officers, their agencies, and the 
community in which they work regarding critical police incidents and police use 
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of force perception by Black Americans.” 
Participant’s Signature: ___________________________ Date: ________________ 
Participant’s Name: ______________________________ Date: ________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: _____________________________ 
Date: _________________________________ 
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
3301 College Avenue. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7796 
(954) 262-3000. 800-262-7978. Fax: (954) 262-3968 
Email shss@nsu.nova.edu. http://shss.nova.edu 
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Appendix C: Invitation Letter and Consent Form—Spanish 
Formulario de Consentimiento/Adultos/General 
# del protocolo del IRB: 2017-134 
Investigadora Principal 
Danielle De Santis Sperandeo, Maestría en Educación 
635 S. Mentor Ave. 
Pasadena, CA 91106 
909-286-0002 
Para preguntas/pendientes acerca de sus derechos en una investigación, comuníquese 
con: 
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board o IRB) 
(Consejo de Vigilancia sobre Investigaciones Humanas [Consejo Institucional de Revisión o 
IRB]) 
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369/Llamada sin cobro: 866-499-0790 
IRB@nsu.nova.edu 
Información de la Dirección del Centro 
 
Introducción 
Se le invita a participar en un estudio de investigación que se realiza para una disertación 
en Nova Southeastern University en Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Antes de consentir en 
participar en este estudio de investigación, es importante que usted lea la siguiente 
explicación de este estudio. Este documento detalla el propósito, procedimientos, 
beneficios, riesgos, molestias y precauciones del programa. También detalla su derecho a 
retirarse del estudio en cualquier momento. No se pueden hacer garantías o asegurar los 
resultados del estudio. 
 
¿De qué se trata el estudio? 
El estudio trata de tener un mejor entendimiento acerca de cómo los padres de niños con 
cáncer deciden acerca del tratamiento a nombre de su hijo. Parte de este estudio incluye 
un interés en los factores de comunicación entre proveedores de servicios de salud y 
padres. Otro interés incluye cómo los padres manejan el proceso de duelo después de la 
pérdida de su hijo a resultado del cáncer. 
 
¿Por qué me pregunta? 
La investigadora principal de este estudio le invita a participar debido a que tiene 
experiencia directa en la toma de decisiones sobre el tratamiento del cáncer y ha sufrido 
la muerte de un hijo debido a complicaciones del cáncer o evolución de la enfermedad. 
Su participación es voluntaria y puede dejar de participar en cualquier momento 
 
¿Qué estaré haciendo si acepto participar en el estudio? 
La duración y profundidad de la posible entrevista dependen del grado en que usted 
quiera participar. Usted tiene derecho a rechazar o cancelar prematuramente su 
participación en este estudio en cualquier momento sin dar razón alguna. Únicamente 
terminaré su participación si determino que está en peligro o representa una amenaza para 
otros. 
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Si acepta participar en el estudio, recibirá un vínculo electrónico para cuatro encuestas y 
una pregunta abierta. Se le presentará una serie de declaraciones sobre su satisfacción con 
la comunicación con los médicos y las decisiones que usted tomó a nombre de su niño. 
Habrá algunas preguntas adicionales sobre cómo se encuentra ahora su propia vida. En 
cada caso, le darán cinco alternativas para responder. Cada encuesta debe tomar más o 
menos 5 a 10 minutos para completar. La última pregunta requerirá que comparta una 
breve historia por escrito. Esta parte de la encuesta debería tomar entre 15 y 20 minutos. 
 
¿Se grabará algo en audio o video? 
No habrá grabación de audio o video en el estudio. Las respuestas de sus encuestas se 
recopilarán e identificarán con un número aleatorio de 4 dígitos. Cualquier información 
recopilada de usted será ingresada, encriptada y almacenada en una unidad de memoria 
basada en la nube, también conocida como DropBox. 
 
¿Cuáles son los peligros para mí? 
No se percibe que haya peligros para usted. 
 
Los posibles riesgos y molestias podrían incluir: 
•Sentimientos de tristeza o enojo al recordar eventos pasados sobre sus experiencias 
en un ambiente de servicios de salud. La investigadora tomará todas las 
precauciones para asegurarse de que usted se sienta con la mayor comodidad 
posible en todas las actividades. 
Si usted fuese a tener la necesidad de recibir asesoramiento individual durante o después 
de su participación en el estudio, usted se debe comunicar con su médico de cabecera 
para obtener una lista de proveedores de salud mental con cobertura por parte de su 
compañía de seguro de servicios de salud. 
Si desea conectarse en línea con un grupo de apoyo para el duelo, consulte la siguiente 
lista de recursos que se encuentra en el sitio web de la American Association of Marriage 
and Family Therapists (Asociación Estadounidense de Terapeutas de Matrimonio y 
Familias): http://www.aamft.org/iMIS15/AAMFT/Content/Consumer_Updates/ Grieving_the 
Loss_of_A_Child. 
aspx 
 
Recursos 
•Bereaved Parents of the U.S.A. Un grupo de auto-ayuda que ofrece apoyo, 
entendimiento, compasión y esperanza para padres, abuelos y hermanos/as en 
luto. 
•Candlelighters Childhood Cancer Foundation: Fundada por padres de niños con 
cáncer, este grupo ofrece apoyo para padres que tienen un niño diagnosticado con 
cáncer y aquellos cuyo niño ha muerto a resultado de cáncer. 
•Compassionate Friends: Una organización para padres en luto, asistiendo a familias 
después de la muerte de un niño. 
Si usted tiene cualquier pregunta o inquietud sobre la investigación, sus derechos en una 
investigación o si tiene una lesión o problema relacionado con la investigación, 
comuníquese con Danielle Sperandeo al número de teléfono anotado en la primera página 
de este documento. También puede comunicarse con el Consejo Institucional de Revisión 
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llamando a los números indicados si tiene preguntas relacionadas con sus derechos en 
una investigación. 
 
¿Hay algún beneficio al participar en este estudio de investigación? 
No hay beneficios directos al participar en este estudio. 
 
¿Recibiré pago por participar? ¿Me costará algo? 
No hay gastos para usted por participar en este estudio. 
Usted no recibirá compensación monetaria por su participación. Sin embargo, en 
agradecimiento por su ayuda, usted recibirá una tarjeta de regalo de Amazon con un valor 
de $ 35.00, que se enviará directamente a su cuenta de correo electrónico. 
 
¿Cómo mantendrá usted mi información privada? 
Toda la información que se obtiene en este estudio es estrictamente confidencial a menos 
que la ley exija una divulgación. Su identidad como participante no será divulgada a 
ninguna persona que no está autorizada; solo los investigadores y el Consejo Institucional 
de Revisión Nova Southeastern University (el comité que aprobó este proyecto de 
investigación) tendrán acceso a los materiales de la investigación, los cuales se 
mantendrán en una caja fuerte con llave por un período de 60 meses. Cualquier referencia 
a su identidad que pudiese comprometer su anonimato será eliminada o disfrazada antes 
de preparar los informes y publicaciones de la investigación. 
 
¿Qué pasa si no quiero participar o si me quiero retirar del estudio? 
La participación en este estudio es voluntaria; negarse a participar no implicará ninguna 
sanción. Usted es libre de retirar su consentimiento y suspender la participación en este 
proyecto en cualquier momento y por cualquier razón. La investigadora contestará las 
preguntas relacionadas con esta investigación antes, durante y después del estudio. 
Cualquier información o contribución que usted haga al estudio se mantendrá durante 60 
meses, pero se excluirá si usted lo solicita 
 
Otras Consideraciones: 
Si hay disponible nueva información de importancia relacionada con el estudio la cual 
pudiese estar relacionada con su deseo de seguir participando, yo se la proporcionaré. 
 
Consentimiento Voluntario del Participante: 
Al firmar a continuación, usted indica que 
•le han explicado este estudio 
•usted tiene por lo menos 21 años de edad 
•usted entiende el idioma español escrito y ha leído este documento o se lo han leído 
•usted tiene acceso regular al Internet 
•le han contestado sus preguntas acerca de este estudio de investigación 
•le han dicho que en el futuro usted puede hacerles a los investigadores cualquier 
pregunta relacionada con el estudio o comunicarse con ellos en caso de una lesión 
relacionada con la investigación 
•le han dicho que puede hacerle preguntas al personal del Consejo Institucional de 
Revisión (IRB) acerca de los derechos que usted tiene como participante en una 
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investigación 
•usted tiene el derecho a una copia de este formulario después de haberla leído y 
firmado, usted consiente voluntariamente a participar en el estudio titulado 
“Conflicto Después de Seleccionar Tratamientos para el Cáncer: Divulgación de 
Información Podría Influir Arrepentimiento Contra-Factual y Auto-Aceptación en 
Padres de Niños con Cáncer que Están en Luto”. 
 
Firma del Participante: ___________________________ Fecha: ________________ 
 
Nombre del Participante: ______________________________ Fecha: 
________________ 
 
Firma de la Persona que Obtiene Consentimiento: _____________________________ 
Fecha: _________________________________ 
Por favor entregue este formulario a dsperandeo@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
3301 College Avenue. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7796 
(954) 262-3000. 800-262-7978. Fax: (954) 262-3968 
Email shss@nsu.nova.edu. http://shss.nova.edu 
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Appendix D: Participant Biographical Data—Questionnaire 
1)Select your preferred language: 
a)English 
b)Spanish 
2)Select which of the following identify you: 
a)I am the mother of a deceased child with cancer 
b)I am the father of a deceased child with cancer 
3)Select your race: 
a)Latino 
b)Asian 
c)Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
d)White 
e)Black 
f)Other 
g)More than one apply 
4)Select the highest education you have completed: 
a)High School diploma or GED 
b)Some college 
c)Bachelor’s degree 
d)Master’s degree 
e)Doctoral degree 
5)Select any conditions you have been diagnosed with: 
a)Depression 
b)Anxiety 
c)Bipolar depression 
d)Other mental illness 
e)None of the above 
6)Which of the following treatments did your child receive: 
a)Chemotherapy 
b)Radiation 
c)Surgery 
d)Bone Marrow transplant 
e)Alternative treatment 
f)More than one 
g)None of the above 
7)How old was your child at the time of diagnosis? ______ 
8)How old was your child at the time of death? _______ 
  
115 
 
Appendix E: Decisional Conflict Scale 
Response options: 
strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree 
1)I knew which options are available to me 
2)I know the benefits of each option 
3)I know the risks and side effects of each option 
4)I am clear about which benefits matter most to me 
5)I am clear about which risks and side effects matter most to me 
6)I am clear about which is more important to me, benefits or risks 
7)I have enough support from others to make a choice 
8)I am choosing without pressure from others 
9)I have enough advice to make a choice 
10)I am clear about the best choice for me 
11)I feel sure about what to choose 
12)This decision is easy for me to make 
13)I feel that I have made an informed choice 
14)My decision shows what is important to me 
15)I expect to stick with my decision 
16)I’m satisfied with my decision 
  
116 
 
Appendix F: The Picker Patient Experience—Content 
Item Item content 
1. Doctors’ answers to questions not clear 
2. Nurses’ answers to questions not clear 
3. Staff gave conflicting information 
4. Doctor didn’t discuss anxieties or fears 
5. Doctors sometimes talked as if I wasn’t there 
6. Not sufficiently involved in decisions about treatment and care 
7. Not always treated with respect and dignity 
8. Nurses didn’t discuss anxieties and fears 
9. Not easy to find someone to talk to about concerns 
10. Staff did not do enough to control pain 
11. Family didn’t get opportunity to talk to doctor 
12. Family not given information needed to help recovery 
13. Purpose of medicines not explained 
14. Not told about medication side effects 
15. Not told about danger signals to look for at home 
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Appendix G: Decision Regret Scale 
Response options: 
strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree 
1)It was the right decision 
2)I regret the choice that was made 
3)I would go for the same choice if I had to do it over again 
4)The choice did me a lot of harm 
5)The decision was a wise one 
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Appendix H: Ryff’s Psychological Well Being Scale/ Self -Acceptance Dimension 
1= Strongly agree and 6 = Strongly disagree 
 I am not afraid to voice my opinions, even when they are in 
opposition to the opinions of most people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 In general, I feel I am in charge of the situation in which I live. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 I am not interested in activities that will expand my horizons. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 Most people see me as loving and affectionate. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 I live life one day at a time and don’t really think about the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 When I look at the story of my life, I am pleased with how things 
have turned out. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 My decisions are not usually influenced by what everyone else is 
doing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
8 The demands of everyday life often get me down. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9 I think it is important to have new experiences that challenge how 
you think about yourself and the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
10 Maintaining close relationships has been difficult and frustrating for 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
11 I have a sense of direction and purpose in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12 In general, I feel confident and positive about myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
13 I tend to worry about what other people think of me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
14 I do not fit very well with the people and the community around me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
15 When I think about it, I haven’t really improved much as a person 
over the years. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
16 I often feel lonely because I have few close friends with whom to 
share my concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17 My daily activities often seem trivial and unimportant to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18 I feel like many of the people I know have gotten more out of life 
than I have. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
19 I tend to be influenced by people with strong opinions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20 I am quite good at managing the many responsibilities of my daily 
life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
21 I have the sense that I have developed a lot as a person over time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
22 I enjoy personal and mutual conversations with family members or 
friends. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
23 I don’t have a good sense of what it is I’m trying to accomplish in 
life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
24 I like most aspects of my personality. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
25 I have confidence in my opinions, even if they are contrary to the 
general consensus. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
26 I often feel overwhelmed by my responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
27 I do not enjoy being in new situations that require me to change my 
old familiar ways of doing things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
28 People would describe me as a giving person, willing to share my 
time with others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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29 I enjoy making plans for the future and working to make them a 
reality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
30 In many ways, I feel disappointed about my achievements in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
31 It’s difficult for me to voice my own opinions on controversial 
matters. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
32 I have difficulty arranging my life in a way that is satisfying to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
33 For me, life has been a continuous process of learning, changing, and 
growth. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
34 I have not experienced many warm and trusting relationships with 
others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
35 Some people wander aimlessly through life, but I am not one of 
them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
36 My attitude about myself is probably not as positive as most people 
feel about themselves. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
37 I judge myself by what I think is important, not by the values of what 
others think is important. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
38 I have been able to build a home and a lifestyle for myself that is 
much to my liking. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
39 I gave up trying to make big improvements or changes in my life a 
long time ago. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
40 I know that I can trust my friends, and they know they can trust me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
41 I sometimes feel as if I’ve done all there is to do in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
42 When I compare myself to friends and acquaintances, it makes me 
feel good about who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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